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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the complex relationship among the mili-
tary,' globalization, and human rights in Africa.2 The broad general
question is how to promote human rights in a continent where the
inhabitants, like citizens in other parts of the world, are actuated by
a zeal for freedom,3 but where, yet, the actual record on respect for
human rights is mixed. 4 The issue of immediate concern is what to
do, as authoritarianism recedes 5 and globalization takes hold in the
world, 6 to assign soldiers a role and ownership in human rights in
Africa. We argue that there is nothing in the nature of the military
as an institution that inherently makes it an enemy of human
rights, 7 portray military rule as disastrous for human rights in Af-
I We interchange the military in this Article with terms such as soldiers, the
army, armies, or the armed forces. Use of words like the military or the army
should not be taken to mean that the African military is monolithic, for it is not.
There is not one but rather many African militaries. See Robin Luckham, The
Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and
Issues, 37 AFR. STUD. REV. 42 (1994) (making a distinction between the military-
as-regime and military-as-institution). For more on African armies, see infra Part
V.
2 See infra Parts VII-IX.
3 See infra Part III (faulting the argument that pre-colonial Africa had no
concept of human rights).
4 See generally infra Part III.
5 See infra Part III.D.
6 See infra Part VII.
7 See infra Part IV.
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rica,8 paint a complex picture of the relationship between globaliza-
tion and human rights, 9 and suggest three strategies designed to
ensure that globalization is more friend than foe for human rights in
the contintent. 10 The Article has three interconnected components.
The first, made up of Parts II and III, explains basic concepts relat-
ing to human rights and traces the history of these rights in Africa.
The second, comprising Parts IV to VI, discusses the connection of
the military to human rights, analyzes the characteristics of African
armies, and highlights the impact of African military on human
rights during the period of authoritarianism. The third and last seg-
ment, encompassing Parts VII to IX, deals with the interaction
among the military, globalization, and human rights in Africa.
II. DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Conceptualizing Human Rights
Human rights are rights, rooted in appeal to human nature,"
which all human beings have simply because they are humans.12
Two features set these rights apart from other rights. 13 First, human
rights are demands or claims individuals or groups make against
their own societies or governments.14 As Professor Jack Donnelly
elaborates, "things to which we have human rights may be denied
by an extensive array of individuals and organizations[,]" but
human rights "are usually taken to have a special reference to the
ways in which states treat their own citizens. ' ' 15 This is why, for ex-
ample, muggings and private assaults are not typically considered
human rights violation, whereas police brutality and torture are. 16
8 See infra Part VI.
9 See infra Part VIII.
10 See infra Part IX.
11 R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13
(1986).
12 See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2d ed.
1998); Jack Donnelly, Unfinished Business, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 533 (1998).
13 For extensive discussion distinguishing human rights from other rights, see
JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1985) (especially ch. 1-2).
14 Donnelly, supra note 12, at 530; JOSHUA A. GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 329 (3d ed. 1999) (charactering human rights as "the universal rights of
human beings against certain abuses of their own governments.") (emphasis in
original).
15 DONNELLY, supra note 12,.at 1.
16 DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 1. These and other problems relating to the
definition of human rights derive from the limitations, as Jack Donnelly correctly
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This does not mean that non-state actors like individuals and orga-
nizations cannot violate human rights, for they can. 17 As Jack Don-
nelly himself puts it, things to which we have human rights may be
denied by individuals and organizations.1 8 It means that the govern-
ment should lead the way in observing these rights, including met-
ing appropriate punishment when non-state actors violate them.19
Second, "the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the
performance of duties on the part of everyone. °20 Human rights
"have as a corollary a duty imposed on the society to ensure their
protection. 21 Specifically, they impose obligations on all organs of
society, including the government, government agencies, private or-
ganizations, and individuals, "not to derogate from these rights. '22
Accordingly, the ACHPR imposes duties on governments and indi-
viduals.23 Other international human rights documents which, like
the ACHPR, more or less incorporate the concept of duty, include
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),24 the Inter-
sees them, to our state-based system of human rights enforcement. See supra note
12.
17 See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE
(1993); Doe v. Unocal Corp, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Multinational cor-
porations can have profound positive impact on human rights by adopting codes of
conduct, promoting "best practice," and establishing benchmarks. See, e.g., Mary
Robinson, The Business Case for Human Rights, Text of Address Before the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights (Nov. 11, 1997), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/ (last visited April 23, 2002).
18 DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 1.
19 See Donnelly, supra note 12, at 533 (providing an instance as to when
affirmative intervention by the government becomes warranted to ensure protec-
tion of rights against violation by powerful groups in society).
20 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), June 27, 1981,
Preamble para. 6, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). See also
Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, The Regional Protection of Human Rights in
Africa: An Overview and Evaluation, in Center for African Studies and College of
Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Symposium on Human Rights
and Development in Africa held July 8-10, 1999 at 1 (1999) (characterizing human
rights as "core interests"-certain things that we cannot do to one another" and
"some duties we owe to each other.")(emphasis added).
21 OSITA C. EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 6 (1984).
22 Id.
23 For the individual, these duties exist toward organs of society like the fam-
ily, society, the state, and the international community, along with a commitment
to African unity. ACHPR, supra note 20, at Arts. 17(3), 27-29.
24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Text of the document is repro-
duced in DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 165-68.
2002] HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 365
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),25 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).26 Some observers worry that coupling rights with duties
may provide dictators excuse they could use to violate human and
peoples' rights. That concern is not baseless given the all too fresh
legacy of human rights violation in Africa.27 However, attention to
duties should not create problem if, as Professor Umozurike, a legal
scholar and former Chairman of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, stated, such duties are not emphasized to the
detriment of individual and collective rights. 28
Challenges to human rights include the contention that (1) the
concept in theory and practice detracts from the doctrine of sover-
eignty; and (2) insistence on universal human rights is a Western
imposition (the so-called cultural relativism versus universalism de-
bate). Tension exists been human rights and the sovereignty doc-
trine.2 9 Countries, such as China and a host of other Asian and non-
Asian states, consider criticism of their human rights records as
meddlesome interference into their internal affairs.30 Even with
growing global acceptance of human rights, 31 some of the tension
25 Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976).
26 Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976). For more on these and
other UN human rights instruments see infra Part III.B.
27 See infra Parts III.C. & VI.
28 U. OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS 65 (1997).
29 See BRUCE RUSSETT ET AL., WORLD POLITICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE
266 (2000) (human rights constitute "a real erosion of state sovereignty."); GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 14, at 329-30 ("The very idea of human rights flies in the face of
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states."); Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational
Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights, 31 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 517 (1998) ("Because international human rights norms question state rule
over society and national sovereignty, human rights issues offer particularly potent
challenges to the central logic of a system of sovereign states .. ."); HEDLEY BULL,
THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 146 (1977) (stating that "[c]arried to its logical ex-
treme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subver-
sive of the whole principle" of sovereignty).
30 David F. Forsythe, Human Rights Fifty Years after the Universal Declara-
tion, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 508 (1998).
31 Id. (noting the evolution of a broad consensus that states should respect
the individual and collective human rights of persons); see also SEYOM BROWN,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD POLITICS at vii, 1-2 (2000) (showing how world politics
has today of necessity become increasingly about human rights).
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still lingers. 32 Cultural relativists dispute the existence of universal
human rights and argue that human rights must recognize cultural/
regional particularities. They view any insistence on universal
human rights standards as a Western imposition.33 One of the
strongest criticism recently of relativism and defense of universal
human rights came from Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, signif-
icantly, at an Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meet-
ing of African leaders. Annan maintains that human rights are
rights "fundamental to humankind itself" that belong to no govern-
ment and are limited to no continent. 34 He strongly disagrees with
African leaders who view concern for human rights as a conspiracy
imposed by the industrialized West. He avers that such contention
demeans "the yearning for human dignity that resides in every Afri-
can heart," quizzing:
Do not African mothers weep when their sons and
daughters are killed or maimed by agents of repressive
rule? Are not African fathers saddened when their
children are unjustly jailed or tortured? Is not Africa as
a whole impoverished when even one of its brilliant
voices is silenced? So I say this to you, my brothers and
sisters, that human rights are African rights, and I call
upon you to ensure that all Africans are able fully to
enjoy them.35
Defenses of universality, such as Annan's, are testimony to the
reality that challenges to universal human rights, whether rooted in
sovereignty or cultural diversity, are still not a thing of the past. Yet,
as the outcome of the Second World Conference of Human Rights
held in Vienna in 1993 made clear, sovereignty and cultural relativ-
ism are on the wane as the possibility of universal human rights
grows by the day. There a number of Asian countries, joined by
32 See Donnelly, supra note 12, at 530-34 (documenting various serious limi-
tations impeding the human rights approach based on state implementation).
33 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 508.
34 Quoted in Felice D. Gaer, Human Rights: What Role in U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy? GREAT DECISIONS, Special Issue 1998, at 33 ( "Human rights are African
rights. They are also Asian rights; they are European rights; they are American
rights. They belong to no government, they are limited to no continent, for they
are fundamental to humankind itself.").
35 Cited in William Minter, America and Africa: Beyond the Double Stan-
dard, 99 CURRENT HISTORY 205 (2000); Gaer, supra note 34, at 33.
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others, openly challenged universalism. These countries articulated
a "Universal Declaration of Duties" (supposedly in place of any
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 36 But participants at the
conference, in a Declaration and Program of Action they adopted
at the end of the meeting, although deferring to "the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural
and religious backgrounds," reiterated that the "universal nature of
these rights and freedoms is beyond question. '37 They declared
human rights and fundamental freedoms "the birthright of all
human beings" and upheld the protection and promotion of these
rights as "the first responsibility of governments. ' 38 Following a res-
olution of the Second World Conference on Human Rights, the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights was appointed in January
1994. 39
In sum, a broad consensus has evolved that states "should re-
spect the individual and collective human rights of persons. ' 40 Sov-
ereignty needs to be creatively reconciled with human rights,41
rather than pose barriers to human rights enjoyment. "Even if the
primary obligation of governments must be to the national interest
defined in terms of power, this need not be their sole, or even ulti-
mate, obligation." 42 As a result, states today increasingly are choos-
ing to "use their sovereignty to restrict their sovereignty," 43 and to
value protection of human rights "over full state independence. '44
Unfettered statism 45 is, thus, giving way to increased toleration of
human rights such that along with sovereignty, human rights have
come to "exist within a set of hegemonic ideas constituting the
36 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 508.
37 UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 5.
38 Cited in LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY TOWARDS CON-
SOLIDATION 4 (1999).
39 UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 12. On a parenthetical note, the World
Conference on Human Rights is consistent in its support of universal human rights.
In its first meeting held in Teheran in 1948, the same body considered that the
UDHR was an obligation for the international community. Supra, at 5.
40 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 508.
41 See Francis M. Deng, Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis
for International Humanitarian Action, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: THE AFRI-
CAN STATE SYSTEM IN FLUX 353-78 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild, eds.,
3d ed. 2000).
42 DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 31.
43 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 509.
44 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 509.
45 See Donnelly, supra note 12, at 532 (who actually uses the words "unre-
flective statism.").
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reigning mantra of world politics."46 Some of the states who oppose
universal human rights do so for no apparent principled reason, but
rather insincerely to, as Professor David P. Forsythe puts it, "ration-
alize their authoritarianism and other departures from human rights
standards. '47 Indeed, as Kofi Annan observed with respect to Af-
rica, it was not ordinary Africans who complained of the universal-
ity of human rights or considered these rights as a Western or
Northern imposition, but rather their leaders who did S0.48 Also
countries like China who still challenge universal human rights
muster and expend enormous amount of diplomatic capital just to
defend themselves and minimize the veil of negative publicity that
today shrouds such challenge.49 As the norms, if not enforcement,
of human rights increasingly take hold in countries all around the
world,50 our world is one in which, as Thomas Jefferson once re-
marked, finally all eyes are opening to "the rights of man."'51
B. Practical Nature of Human Rights
There is something fundamentally practical about human
rights. They are necessary for domestic peace. Individuals and
groups need these rights to self-actualize themselves and contribute
46 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 508.
47 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 508.
48 Quoted in BROWN, supra note 31, at xii.
49 KAREN A. MINGST & MARGARET P. KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS IN
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 193 (2d ed. 2000).
50 Id. at 193-94.
51 Jefferson's last letter quoted in Robert J-P. Hauck, Gaining Ground?: The
Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty, 31 PS: POL. ScI. & POL. 505 (1998). Note
that Jefferson is utterly conflicted in his concept of freedom. He wrote the Decla-
ration of Independence which proclaimed that "all men are created equal," but
expressed the belief, contained in his Notes on Virginia, that blacks were inherently
inferior to whites, "inferior by nature, not condition." Jefferson "is the embodi-
ment of the contradiction in the American democracy between its declaration of
universal freedom and equality and its practice of slavery." HANES WALTON, JR. &
ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN QUEST
FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 10 (2000) (Professors Walton and Smith appropriately
hold out Jefferson as "the paradigmatic figure" for anyone who seeks to under-
stand how the idea of universal freedom became fatally compromised in America:
author of the Declaration [of Independence], preeminent intellectual, acquain-
tance through correspondence of eminent African American intellectual Benjamin
Banneker, and a man with perhaps a genuine love relationship with a black
woman-and also a racist, white supremacist, and a slave owner.). Id. at 7.
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usefully to societal development.5 2 Free and full development of
people envisaged by the UDHR 53 is made difficult, if not impossi-
ble, without these rights or when they exist but go unrespected.
Human rights are also necessary for international peace. They are "
.. common understanding of what" "core interests" human need
in an "interactive and interdependent world' ''to avoid conflict and
allow human interaction across previously existing borders . . . 54
Conflicts recognize no national boundaries and "[a] government's
abuses of its own citizens can inflame ethnic conflicts, undermine
moral norms of decency, and in other ways threaten the peace and
stability of the international community. ' 55 This is why these rights
have become "the minimum standard for acceptance into the inter-
national community," and why "[a]dherence to human rights
norms" is now "the precondition for admission into the global vil-
lage."' 56 How a country treats its own citizen is no longer exclusively
its internal affairs57 but rather has emerged today as the legitimate
business of the world. 58 Governments should, therefore, see in
human rights a wellspring of power they can tap into to legitimize
their rule.59 It is in their enlightened self-interest to respect these
rights. 60 Regimes who fail or neglect to observe these norms or
52 Philip C. Aka (with Gloria J. Browne), Education, Human Rights, and the
Post-Cold War Era, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 447 (1999).
53 UDHR, supra note 24, at art. 29. See also the pragmatic imperatives listed
in the preamble that motivated the adoption and proclamation of the UDHR.
These include that: (i) recognition of the inherent dignity, equality, and inalienable
rights of all human beings is the basis for global freedom, justice, and peace; (ii)
contempt and disregard for human rights in the past resulted in barbarous acts
which outraged the conscience of the world; (iii) guarantees like freedom of
speech, freedom of conscience, and freedom from fear are among the highest aspi-
ration of "common people"; and (iv) if human rights are not protected by rule of
law, people may be left with no other option than to resort to rebellion to shake off
tyranny and oppression. Supra.
54 Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 20, at 1.
55 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 330.
56 Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 20, at 1.
57 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 508 (maintaining "[n]ational policymakers ...
no longer have the luxury of saying with a straight face that human rights are a
strictly national matter, to be addressed or not as the nation wishes. Human rights
are part of every nation's policy agenda.").
58 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 510 (outlining fitful yet inexorable trends "link-
ing protection of human rights to the daily and practical exercise of state sover-
eignty"; these trends involve big and small powers alike).
59 See UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 5 (maintaining, quoting another au-
thor, that "[r]ights are the ideals and distinguishing marks of a civilized society.").
60 See UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 128.
370 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [VoL. XVIII
rights deny themselves an important source of legitimacy and au-
thority they need to ground their rule. 61 The quibble as to whether
development includes attention to human rights is now over.62 The
vogue today is how to put democracy and human rights "at the ser-
vice of development. 63 Accordingly, in Africa development is now
understood to include, in addition to material-based rights, atten-
tion to political-civil rights and the rights of groups without which
legitimacy or the right to rule can become quickly endangered. No
genuine development takes place at the expense of human rights.64
61 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 510.
62 See Rhoda Howard, The Full Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take
Priority Over Civil and Political Rights?: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5
HUM. RTS. Q. 467-490 (1983). The main point of the article is hard to assail, but
not so some of the evidence Howard adduced to "prove" her point. The statement
by the late President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania, id. at 467, which she used to
illustrate African leaders' favor of socioeconomic rights and their disdain for politi-
cal-civil rights is actually an ambiguous one that could equally be an argument for
the complementarity of the two sets of rights. Still, in all fairness to Howard, Presi-
dent Nyerere, at least at some point in his political career, stressed the primacy of
socioeconomic over civil-political rights. In 1964, on the occasion of the opening of
the University of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian President gave an address in which
he justified the introduction of a law giving the government the power to detain
people without trial. Nyerere told his listeners that: "Here in this Union condi-
tions may arise in which it is better that ninety-nine innocent people should suffer
temporary detention than that one possible traitor should wreck the nation ...
Development must be considered first ... Our question with regard to any matter-
even the issue of fundamental freedom of fundamental freedom-must be, 'How does
this affect the progress of the Development Plan?"' JULIUS NYERERE, FREEDOM
AND UNITY 312 (1966) (emphasis added).
63 See Larry Diamond, Protecting Democracy in Africa: U.S. and Interna-
tional Policies in Transition, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: POST-COLD WAR
CHALLENGES 272 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild,. eds., 2d ed. 1995) (cit-
ing the slogan and work of Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Ddmocratie
et le D6veloppement tconomique et Social (GERDDES-Africa), a pan-African
civil society organization designed to build the culture of democracy, among other
goals). See also Heynes & Viljoen, supra note 20, at t (stating that "the link be-
tween human rights and development ... is widely recognized"); Stephen Wright,
The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES
15 (Stephen Wright, ed. 1999) (arguing that legitimate government and reinvigo-
rated public institutions are now widely recognized as key elements in building
viable economies).
64 UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 23. See also Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan,
Toward Consolidated Democracies, in CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD WAVE DE-
MOCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 15 (Larry Diamond et al. eds. 1997) (in-
sisting that, irrespective of how freely elected they were or the substantiality of
their majority, regimes should not be viewed as democracies if they fail to respect
the rights of individuals and minorities, among other constitutional subversions).
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C. Classification of Human Rights
Human rights may be classified based on when they were gen-
erated or by who the rights were generated for. These two broad
classification systems are inclusive rather than mutually exclusive.
Three clusters or categories of rights evident when human rights are
classified based on when they were generated are civil and political
rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and solidarity rights.
Civil and political rights (referred to elsewhere in this Article as
civil-political or political-civil rights) are actually two categories-
civil and political-that, because they are closely interconnected, are
often subsumed into one. Civil rights are the individual's legal right
to protection against the state. Under the UDHR, these rights in-
clude the right to life, liberty, and security of the person (Art. 3);
freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude (Art. 4); freedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment (Art. 5); the right to recognition as a person before the .law
(Art. 6); the right.of equality before the law (Art. 7); right to rem-
edy for violation of rights (Art. 8); right not to be exposed to arbi-
trary arrest, detention, or exile (Art. 9); right to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal (Art. 10); right to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty and to not be held guilty
for an act not a crime at the time the act was committed (Art. 11);
and the right to protection from arbitrary attacks on one's privacy
or reputation (Art. 12).
Political rights encompass mainly the rights to freedom of ex-
pression and to political participation. Under the UDHR, these
rights include freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Art.
18); freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19); freedom of as-
sembly and association (Art. 20); and the rights to take part in one's
government, to have equal access to the public service, and to vote
in periodic and genuine elections with universal and equal suffrage
(Art. 21).
Civil-political rights are elaborated in the ICCPR. They are
also guaranteed in Arts. 3-6 of the ACHPR. The constitutions of
many developing countries protect many of these rights as "funda-
mental rights. ' 65 These rights are referred to sometimes as "first
65 See, e.g., F.R. NIG. CONST. Ch. IV, §30-34 (1979) (whose provisions in7
clude the right to life, dignity of human persons, personal liberty, fair hearing,
private and family life, right to freedom from discrimination (civil rights); and right
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generation" rights. They are primarily the legacy of the Age of En-
lightenment and the American Bill of Rights. 66
Economic, social, and cultural rights (referred to elsewhere in
this Article as material-based or socioeconomic rights) are rights
individuals need to complement civil-political rights; without them
enjoyment of civil and political rights is incomplete and compro-
mised. 67 Under the UDHR, these rights include the right to social
security (Art. 22); right to work, to freely choose one's place of
employment, and to have protection against unemployment; right
to "just and favorable remuneration ensuring ... an existence wor-
thy of human dignity," and the right to form and join trade unions
(Art. 23); right to rest and leisure (Art. 24); right to an "adequate"
standard of living, including security in times of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, and old age, and special care to
mothers and children (Art. 25); right to free and compulsory educa-
tion (Art. 26); and the right to freely participate in the cultural life
of one's community (Art. 27). Socioeconomic rights are elaborated
in the ICESCR. They are also guaranteed in Arts. 17-18 of the
ACHPR. 68 These rights are known as "second generation" rights.
They are primarily the legacy of the Age of Industrialization and
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and the
press, peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of movement (political
rights)).
66 Aka, supra note 52, at 430.
67 See ACHPR, supra note 20, at para. 7 (stating that "civil and political
rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their con-
ception as well as universality and . . . the satisfaction of economic, social and
cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights."); Chris
W. Ogbondah, Press Freedom in West Africa: An Analysis of one Ramification of
Human Rights, 22 ISSUE 21 (1994) (indicating that the "ramifications" of human
rights "cover political, economic, social, and cultural rights."); EZE, supra note 21,
at 6 (portraying these two categories of rights as "interrelated" rather than
"rigid."); WALTON & SMITH, supra note 51, at 114, n. 4 (suggesting that the demar-
cation between these two categories of rights is artificial or arbitrary, given that
socioeconomic rights might be appropriately viewed as civil-political right). Still
on this connection between civil-political and economic-social-cultural rights, the
American utmost civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, most instructively
and revealingly, characterized his massive 1963 march to Washington where he
presented his famed "I have a Dream" speech as a march for Freedom and Job.
See STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS TODAY
160-61 (1.999-2000 ed. 1999).
68 For more on these rights, see UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 45-49; A.H.
ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 252-54 (4th ed.
1996).
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the Soviet Constitution of 1917.69 Following the example of the
United States and other industrialized countries, 70 many African
countries see these rights as mere aspirations, not real rights worthy
of protection in the constitution as fundamental rights. In Nigeria,
economic and social rights are denoted non-justiciable, meaning
that, unlike civil-political rights, citizens may not sue and get reme-
dies in a court of law for these rights when their governments vio-
late them. 71
Solidarity rights refer to the rights of collectivities or groups
like women, children, the disabled, elderly persons, and nationali-
ties or ethnic groups. This category also includes the right to self-
determination, right to development, right of peoples' to free dispo-
sal of their natural resources, right to international peace and secur-
ity, and the right to a clean or healthy environment.72 What makes
these rights solidarity is that they require "the solidarity of all peo-
ples," specifically "the cooperation of the other members of the in-
ternational community to carry into effect. ' 73 This "third" or latest
generation of rights to be recognized by the international commu-
nity reflects the failure of domestic sovereignty in the latter part of
the 20th century to solve global problems.74 Although the ACHPR
is considered as something of unique for embodying these rights,
some UN instruments also recognize them, particularly the right to
69 Aka, supra note 52, at 430.
70 For analysis on the conflicted position of the U.S. relating to socioeco-
nomic rights, see, e.g., Virginia A. Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on
International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES 15-30 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng, eds. 1990).
71 See F.R. NIG. CONST. (1979) (subsuming these rights under Chap. II relat-
ing to the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy). See also
REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE VOL. 1, at v-vii (1977)
(elaborating the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy).
72 MINGST & KARNS, supra note 49, at 165; CHRIS M. PETER, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AFRICA 59-74 (1990).
73 UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 51.
74 Aka, supra note 52, at 430. As Karel Vasak, who first elaborated this latest
generation of rights, explains it:
These rights seek to infuse human dimension into areas where it
has all too often been missing, having been left to the state or states
.... [T]hey are new in that they may be both invoked against the
state and demanded of it; but above all ... they can be realized
only through the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social
scene: the individual, state, public and private bodies and the inter-
national community.
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self-determination. 75 For example, the UN General Assembly in
1986 approved the Right to Development. 76
Classified based on who they were generated for, human rights
embrace both individual and group or collective rights. The African
regional human rights instrument, the ACHPR, as we have said and
as the language of its very title pointedly conveys, protects these
two categories of rights.
This discussion on the classification of human rights will be in-
complete without a brief comment on the politics surrounding the
classification. There are two issues relating to that politics that we
here draw attention to. The first is the differential priority different
countries with different economic systems in the past assigned to
the different generations of rights. "The Cold War record on global
human rights was one in which the socialist and capitalist worlds
argued over which-political-civil rights or socioeconomic rights-
should take precedence. It was an ideologically-colored debate in
which the capitalist world favored political-civil rights while the so-
cialist orbit preferred socioeconomic rights. '77 The ICCPR and the
ICESCR had in 1948 been envisioned as a single treaty, denoted as
the International Human Rights Covenants, but was broken into
two because of the Cold War.78 The jury is still out as to the extent
to which the advent of the post-Cold War era has changed this ori-
entation. Still on this first point, not all countries or scholars con-
sider solidarity or third-generation rights real rights. For example,
Professor Jack Donnelly has criticized the right to development as
conceptually and practically flawed. 79 Western human rights schol-
ars like Donnelly incorrectly perceive these rights as nothing more
than an attempt to resuscitate through the backdoor and continua-
tion of the demand during the 1970s for a new international eco-
nomic order by African and other developing countries. A second
and heart-warming issue in the politics of human rights classifica-
tions relates to the important contribution socialism made to global
Quoted in UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 51.
75 ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 68, at 34-5.
76 MINGST & KARNS, supra note 49, at 165.
77 Aka, supra note 52, at 422.
78 DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 8; RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 2 (1986); Leary, supra note 70, at 25-26.79 Jack Donnelly, The "Right to Development": How Not to Link Human
Rights and Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 261-
83 (Claude E. Welch Jr. & Ronald 1. Meltzer, eds. 1984).
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human rights. In addition to socioeconomic rights, that contribution
includes, as Professor Umozurike points out, the realization of self-
determination by colonial peoples, and the universal condemnation
of racial discrimination as an official policy.80
In sum, all the various categories of human rights are real. As
Jack Donnelly said, "[e]verything that is on a list of human rights-
any list-is a human right."'81 The various "generations" of rights
highlight the evolution and mutual interdependence of these rights
rather than suggest that any category should have priority over the
others. In fact, Joseph Wronka argues that the UDHR, in its thirty
articles, embodies each of these generations of rights along with a
fourth category, "human dignity," which Wronka believes article 1
of the document exemplifies.8 2
III. HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
One "obstacle" often encountered in tracing the history of
human rights in Africa is the debate as to whether the concept of
human rights existed in pre-colonial Africa.8 3 This is an unproduc-
tive debate we do not wish to join for two reasons. First, freedom
"is a fundamental, driving force of the human condition" and there-
fore something that Africans, like any other civilization, indulge
in.8 4 Black presence contributed to the genesis of the idea of free-
dom in the United States and the Western world.8 5 One of the most
heart-warming stories of successful struggle for independence in
contemporary period, if not of all times, involved the black republic
Haiti. Formerly Saint-Domingue, Haiti won its independence in
1804 from France, in the process distinguishing itself as the country
second only to the United States to fight and win a war of indepen-
dence in the Western Hemisphere.86 Briefly, as some perceptive
scholars argue, the idea of human rights is something "common to
all civilizations," even though "the core interests" that idea encom-
80 UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 10-11.
81 DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 1.
82 Joseph Wronka, Creating a Human Rights Culture: A Strategy for a So-
cially Just Policy Toward Africa, in AFRICA IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL DISORDER: CRISIS AND POSSIBILITIES 129-30 ( Joseph Wronka, ed., 1996).
83 See EZE, supra note 21, ch. 1.
84 See WALTON & SMITH, supra note 51, at 16 n. 6 (rebutting the claim by
one writer that freedom in its origins is a uniquely Western value).
85 WALTON & SMITH, supra note 51, at 4-5, 16 n. 8.
86 JAN ROGOZINSKI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN 166-67 (2000).
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passes "have been defined differently. by various cultures through
history. 87
Second, human rights in the developed format we know it is an
idea of recent vintage. Human rights became "the single most mag-
netic political idea of the contemporary time" only following the
end of World War 11. 88 In particular, it took the inauguration of the
UN system for the world community to be ushered into what Pro-
fessor David P. Forsythe aptly called "an age of international
human rights. ' 89 Prior to the evolution of the UN as a successor to
the League of Nations after World War II, no full development of
what we know today as human rights existed, not even in developed
constitutional systems like the United States.90 Human rights be-
came a part of the agreement in East-West relations, by way of the
Helsinki Accord, 91 only in the mid-1970s, and an articulated major
goal of U.S. foreign policy only beginning in 1976 with the Carter
presidency.92
Table 1 presents what we consider major events in the history
and evolution of human rights in Africa. Close examination of the
events reveals something of a fateful sea-saw, breakable into four
stages (see below), in the evolution of these rights. But before we
get to that sea-saw, a few general comments on the list. First, it is
illustrative rather than exhaustive. For example, the list does not
include slavery (as contrasted from the slave trade itself) which till
date, unfortunately, still goes on in countries such as the Sudan. 93 It
does not also include recent occurrences in the continent, with seri-
ous consequences for human rights, such as the HIV/AIDS epi-
87 Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 20, at 1; H. HAMALENGWA ET AL., THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: BASIC DOCUMENTS AND AN-
NOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, at v. (1988).
88 ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE: THE BIRTH AND DEATH
OF COMMUNISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 256 (1989). As of 1948, prior to the
formation of the UN, the only human rights violations legally proscribed were slav-
ery, genocide, and abuses against aliens. MINGST & KARNS, supra note 49, at 193.
89 Forsythe, supra note 30, at 507.
90 See Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration and the U.S. Constitution, 31
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 512-15 (1998) (among other things, showing various respects
in which the UDHR bettered U.S. constitutionalism).
91 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 331. For more on this Accord, see Aka,
supra note 52, at 438 n. 77.
92 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 332.
93 See, e.g., Africa's New Slave Trade, 24 WILSON Q. 119-20 (2000); S. Lov-
gren, Paying for Freedom, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPr., May 3, 1999, at 41; The
Price Tag on Freedom, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 50-1.
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demic,94 and World Bank-IMF-induced structural adjustment
programs (SAPs). 95 Third, some of the event-categories, such as
Nos. 1 and 2 on the list, are mutually inclusive or run parallel. Also,
military rule may be justifiably viewed as a sub-species of authori-
tarian rule in Africa. Discussion of the event is reserved for Part VI
where the topic is given extensive treatment.
TABLE 1: EVENTS IN AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORY
Event
1. The Trans-Saharan and Indian
Ocean Slave Trade
2. The Atlantic Slave Trade
3. European Colonialism
4. South African apartheid
5. Evolution of the UN System
6. Political independence
7. Majority rule in South Africa
8. Authoritarianism
9. Military rule
10. Political conflicts (including "civil"
and inter-state wars)
11. Adoption of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples Rights
12. Post-Authoritarian
Approximate Time Period
7th-early 2 0 "h cc.
Mid-15th-late 19th CC.
19th-20th centuries
1910-1994
1945 till date
1957-1990.
1994
1960s to 1990s
1960s to 1990s
1960 -
1986
1990 -
A. Stage I. Human Rights Violated
Three events with consequences for human rights in Africa
during this first period were the trans-Saharan and Indian Ocean
94 About 70 percent of the world's population infected with HIV/AIDS is in
Africa. See A Turning-Point for AIDS?, in WORLD POLITIcs 204-207 (Helen E.
Purkitt, ed., 2001) (estimating that 25 million of the 34 million infected people in
the world live in Africa); Michael D. Lemonick, Little Hope, Less Help, TIME, July
24, 2000, at 38. The epidemic received continent-level attention at a summit meet-
ing of African leaders held in Abuja on April 27, 2001 at the end of which meeting
these leaders adopted the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, TB & Related Dis-
eases. See D'Arcy Doran, African Leaders Declare AIDS Emergency, Reuters,
April 27, 2001.
95 For one critical assessment of these programs, see NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL.,
POLITICs AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 340-49 (3d ed. 1999).
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Slave trade, the Atlantic slave trade, and European colonization of
the continent. These events went on for a combined period of thir-
teen centuries and represent thirteen lost centuries in the struggle
toward modernity and human rights in Africa. The trans-Saharan
and Indian Ocean Slave trade dealt with the Middle East and flour-
ished in the east coast of the continent around Zanzibar. It involved
an estimated eleven and a half million persons who lost their free-
doms when they became enslaved and were exported.96 The Atlan-
tic slave trade dealt with Europe and entailed the forced migration
of Africans, most of them able-bodied men in their prime, whose
labors were needed to work the plantations in "the rich lands of the
Americas, from the Potomac to southern Brazil" that formed the
New World.97 This trade involved an estimated 10 to 20 million per-
sons.98 This number does not include the million of lives lost during
slave raids and wars associated with those raids; events connected
with the "middle passage" from Africa to the New World; and to
diseases in the New World.99
It is fair to say, as some writers calculate, that the Atlantic
slave trade inflicted on Africa a human hemorrhage estimated at
between 60 and 150 million people.' 0 0 Few treatments can ap-
proach the ultimate deprivation of rights slavery signifies for the
enslaved. The English abolitionist and politician William Wilber-
force (1759-1833) once intoned that "[n]ever can so much misery be
found condensed into so small a space as in a slave ship,"'10 but life
in the ship, hard still as it was, formed the beginning of misery for
those slaves lucky to make it alive to the New World. Slaves were
considered properties of their masters and were in most instances
treated as things rather than persons. One major factor which sets
the Atlantic slave trade apart from other slave trades in Africa, ne-
farious as those other slave trades still were, is the fact that the
Atlantic slave trade commercialized the character of slavery that
existed in the continent before Europeans established a permanent
96 Id. at 252.
97 RENIP DUMONT, FALSE START IN AFRICA 35 (1966).
98 Id. at 36.
99 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 252.
100 DUMONT, supra note 97, at 36. To appreciate the enormity of the damage
this trade inflicted on Africa, in the 1 8th century, the continent comprised one-fifth
of the world's population (with a population about the size of Europe), but by the
first half of the 2 0"h century, mostly due to the Atlantic slave trade, its share of
global population had shrunk to just about one-twelfth. Supra.
101 Cited in UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 12.
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trading presence in the region and transformed a formerly localized
domestic institution into a sizable international trade.'0 2 Because
the two slave trades described here paralleled each other, they ex-
erted a synergistic destructive effect on human rights in Africa that
is nothing but tragic.
Colonialism occurred in the wake of the slave trades and built
on the scale of violations these trades, particularly 'the one across
the Atlantic, left in their trails. European colonialism in Africa is an
event of foreign domination that was motivated by multiple influ-
ences, including intensified strategic competition among European
powers and the imperatives of capitalism.' 0 3 A wave of European
explorers, missionaries, and military officials arrived in Africa after
the 1840s who began to chart the interior of the continent, estab-
lishing alliances or supremacy in different areas and conducting mil-
itary campaigns against hostile groups.10 4 The Berlin Conference of
1884-1885 marked the beginning point of this moment of human
rights violations in Africa. The conference reconciled the competing
claims by various European powers over African territories and
formalized the "scramble for Africa" that came into full swing after
1870, as various European countries marked their spheres of influ-
ence and delineated territorial boundaries.'0 5 Africans had become
used to the appearance of "strangers at the gates" 10 6 long before
the occurrence of the Berlin conference, but what sets colonial
domination apart from all previous contacts was that it "fundamen-
tally upset the political structures of the continent.' 07
Colonial rule the way it unfolded in Africa has several features
that negated even rudimentary notion of human rights. For illustra-
tion sake, we here analyze three of those features. The first was
force. The entire architecture of colonial rule, like that of military
rule down the road in the continent, was built and maintained solely
and completely on naked force designed to crush any and every
"native" resistance to external domination.10 8 The best known of
102 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 252.
103 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 253.
104 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 253.
105 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 253.
106 ROLAND OLIVER, THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: MAJOR THEMES IN AFRI-
CAN HISTORY FROM EARLIEST TIMES To THE PRESENT 159-73 (1991).
107 Id. at 159.
108 A word like crush would be an appropriate characterization here because
everywhere the practice was, as Crawford Young conveys in an apt metaphor, Bula
Matari, or one who breaks all rocks. This was a title bestowed on the famous En-
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these techniques of force include "pacification," forced labor, and
forced tax. Notwithstanding its deceptive peaceable sounding name,
pacification was a violent military process that was, as the historian
Basil Davidson points out, very destructive of African law and or-
der.10 9 Another technique of force, commonplace in the colonies,
was forced labor. Like slavery before it, forced* labor was "very
wasteful of life,"'110 and even, in some respects, as Davidson re-
minds us, worse than slavery.1 1' This technique was often accompa-
nied with restrictions on the free movement of colonial people.112
Forced tax meant that African men were made to pay taxes in
money which they could get only if they worked for whites for
wages. 1 3 As Davidson elaborates, the whole process removed great
numbers of men from rural life, turned farmers into wage-workers
and ruined rural stability and peace." 4 Given the war of indepen-
dence that in more than a few places in the continent accompanied
it, even the decolonization process itself, as A.J. Christopher ob-
serves, involved force and was occasionally bloody.1 5 Briefly, colo-
glish explorer Henry Stanley after he successfully forced a caravan of African por-
ters to dismantle and hand-carry several steamships up the Congo River.
CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE 1 (1994).
109 BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY
12 (3d ed. 1995). See also A.J. CHRISTOPHER, COLONIAL AFRICA 39 (1984) (stat-
ing that pacification "had a strong military emphasis.").
110 DAVIDSON, supra note 109, at 16.
111 In one wrenching story Davidson narrates in his book, in 1930, an Italian
official posted to Somalia wrote home to his government that his "duties" had
become too heavy. This worried official reported that methods of forced labor in
Somalia were "a good deal worse than slavery." If a man were a slave, he said, his
master would care well for him; otherwise, if the man died from overwork, his
master would have to buy another slave. But forced workers cost nothing. "So
when a Somali native dies after being given to an employer, or becomes unfit for
work," wrote this official, "the employer simply asks the government to give him
another." DAVIDSON, supra note 109, at 23.
112 EZE, supra note 21, at 16.
113 DAVIDSON, supra note 109, at 17.
114 DAVIDSON, supra note 109, at 17. One African trade unionist somberly
summarized the situation thus in1929: "First the white man brought the Bible.
Then he brought guns, then chains, then he built a jail, then he made the native pay
tax." Supra.
115 CHRISTOPHER, supra note 109, at 39. (These wars of independence oc-
curred in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia). The longest wars, lasting from 1961 to 1974-
75, took place in the three former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau,
and Mozambique.).
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nial rule was, by definition, inherently coercive/repressive and
authoritarian. 16
Second, colonial rule violated the rights of Africans to deter-
mine for themselves and control their own destinies rather than
have foreigners determine for them. Third, because it was designed
to maintain law and order and nothing else,117 colonial rule worked
against any notion of "development" as we know it in our time.
Accordingly, little development of the colonies occurred during co-
lonial rule. Economic development, where it occurred at all, "had a
strictly limited meaning" focused around money spent on railways,
harbors, and other physical infrastructures (often built through
forced labor) colonial businesses, mostly mining companies, needed
to realize their profits.118 In the same vein, little foreign aid existed
during the colonial period. Rather, what little money the colonial
powers allocated to "foreign aid" was designed "to help the colonial
economies to export more wealth." 11 9
In sum, European colonial rule in Africa was marked by the
abuse of Africans' individual and collective rights across all three
categories or classifications of human rights. It also left in its wake
negative legacies in politics, economics, and social lives with ruin-
ous consequences for human rights in Africa. The UDHR pro-
claimed human rights for everyone in 1948 that were not applied to
colonial Africa.' 20 In addition, the colonial powers either created
rights they applied to citizens in the mother countries but denied to
subjects in the colonies 12' or enacted laws in both home and colony
116 EZE, supra note 21, at 20.
117 DAVID LAMB, THE AFRICANS 138 (1984).
118 DAVIDSON, supra note 109, at 53; OLIVER, supra note 106, at 224.
119 OLIVER, supra note 106, at 240.
120 Susanne Riveles, [Guest] Editor's Introduction, 22 ISSUE 3 (1994); EZE,
supra note 21, at 16. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill attempted to ex-
clude the application of the Atlantic Charter to British colonial subjects on the
ground that the document was intended only for Europeans under Nazi yoke, "a
separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in
the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British crown." Proclaimed by
Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt of the US, the Charter recognized the
right of all peoples to a government of their choice. A West African press delega-
tion led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria presented a protest memorandum to
the British Government calling for the applicability of the Charter to Africa.
UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 24.
121 EZE, supra note 21, at 20.
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that were more strictly enforced in the colony. 122 For example, one
useful study on the law of defamation in Commonwealth Africa
found that sedition laws "were both stricter than those in England
... and more frequently invoked."'1 23 Experience of European colo-
nial rule brought some lasting benefits to Africa,124 but on balance,
it is fair, as one analyst assessed, that rather than enrich Africa,
"colonial rule left the continent and its people exploited and
brutalized." 125
B. Stage 2: Respite from Violation and Movement
Toward Protection
Human rights events from the list covered within this period
include political independence and the UN system. Political inde-
pendence, depicted as "the birth of nations," was among the topics
Roland Oliver outlined in his work on major themes of African his-
tory.126 Two reasons make this event a milestone and justify the
significance we assign it in the evolution of human rights in Africa.
The first is the renewed hope for improved human rights in Africa
that achievement of political independence generated. The second
122 JILL COTTRELL, LAW OF DEFAMATION IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 8
(1998).
123 Id. In Nigeria and other British colonies, London used laws of sedition as
a weapon to deliberately thwart or impede the evolution of a free press. Id.
124 For example, Frank Barton, talked about "the tradition of press freedom
which dates from the colonial period . . . " FRANK BARTON, THE PRESS OF AF-
RICA: PERSECUTION AND PERSERVERANCE 7 (1979). See also Larry Diamond, Ni-
geria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AFRICA, at 68 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1988); LAMB,
supra note 118, at 301 (both attributing incipient tradition of press freedom in
Nigeria to, as Diamond states, the "relatively liberal character of British colonial
rule" in the country). But even such credit to colonial rule is disputed by other
scholars. See COTTRELL, supra note 122, at 8 (conveying that "colonial govern-
ments viewed newspapers with suspicion, and hardly laid a firm foundation for a
free press in independent Africa."); Tunji Dare, The Press, in TRANSITION WITH-
OUT END: NIGERIAN POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER BABANGIDA, at 450
(Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997) (pointing out that, as early as 1859, long before
the formal amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, newspapers existed in the territory
that later became Nigeria and arguing that the newspaper press evolved in the
country "as an instrument of protest by educated Africans denied participation in
the governance of the British colony."); and PETER GOLDING & PHILIP ELLIOTr,
MAKING THE NEWS 21 (1979) (stating that "Nigerian journalism was created by
anti-colonial protest, [and] baptized in the waters of nationalist propaganda...
125 Riveles, supra note 120, at 3.
126 OLIVER, supra note 106, at 227-40.
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is because, as we earlier indicated, independence was not cost-free
for human rights since, in more than a few countries in the conti-
nent, independence came only at the end of a bloody war.' 2 7 To
these two reasons may be added a third one that made the accom-
plishment sweet indeed: decolonization happened quickly in rude
defiance of the logic of an expected European prolonged occupa-
tion.128 Political independence, the way it unfolded in Africa, was a
spaced-out process. Thirty-three long years elapsed between the in-
dependence of Ghana in 1957 and that of Namibia in 1990 (the
number stretches to 68 years if we count from the independence of
Arab Egypt in 1922).
A second event with significance for human rights within this
period was the institution of the UN system as a successor to the
League of Nations. As an international organization, the UN both
helped sire and reinforce the process of political independence in
Africa and other formerly dependent regions. The UN Charter first
broached the modern concept of human rights12 9 that UN human
rights instruments like the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR later fully
flowered and elaborated. 130 These three instruments collectively
comprise what is appropriately called the International Bill of
Rights. However, although best known, these three do not re-
present the corpus of UN global human rights instruments. Rather,
that corpus includes four other important treaties, namely: the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), 131 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 132 the Convention
against Torture (CAT), 133and the Convention on the Rights of the
127 See CHRISTOPHER, supra note 109, at 39.
128 See OLIVER, supra note 106, at 213-16.
129 U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68, & 76 (Especially arts.
55 & 56, requiring member states to cooperate to realize human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the world for all.). A text of this document is reproduced in
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE
AND POWER 561-90 (5th ed. rev. 1978).
130 HAMALENGWA ET AL., supra note 87, at v; Henkin, supra note 90, at 512.
131 Covention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
132 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979) (entered into force Sep. 3, 1981).
133 Convention Against Torture (CAT), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force Jun. 26, 1987).
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Child (CRC). 134 Regional human rights systems like Africa's (dis-
cussed below) derive some of their inspiration from the UN Charter
and UN global human rights instruments. These documents, espe-
cially the UDHR, also inspired and nurtured the (still incipient)
constitutionalism and respect for human rights we see today in
many African and other developing countries. 35 Professor Louis
Henkin praises the UDHR as "the most important international
document of the twentieth century" and believes the declaration
signals the birth certificate of the International Human Rights
Movement, "marking and confirming the new international concern
with human rights."'1 36 This is a praise that could actually go to the
UN system as a whole. 137
C. Stage III: Descent into Violation
Events on the list wrought with consequences for human rights
encompassed under this stage include apartheid in South Africa,
authoritarianism, military rule (saved for Part VI), and political
conflicts. Unveiled formally during the administration of the Na-
tional Party (NP) in 1948, apartheid was the official policy of strict
segregation and separate development of the races that culminated
the racism by the white minority group perpetrated against blacks
in South Africa.' 38 Although a policy enacted in South Africa, its
134 Convention on the Rights of Children (CRC), G.A. Res. 44/52, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess. (1989) (entered into force Sep. 2, 1990).
135 There are scholars who argue that the reaffirmation of the UDHR's essen-
tial principles in regional and international human rights instruments as well as in
the national constitutions of numerous countries lends the document the status of
international customary law binding on all states, including the exceedingly few
countries today that have not expressly consented to the document. UMOZURIKE,
supra note 28, at 11. See also JEFF HAYNES, THIRD WORLD POLITICS 128 (1996)
(indicating changes effected, in response to the specific concerns of developing
countries, that have changed the provisions and tone of the original document).
136 Henkin, supra note 90, at 512. See also Donnelly, supra note 12, at 532
(who credits the UDHR for the "immense political and moral progress toward
nondiscrimination over the past half century," important to him because of the
important basis the right of non-discrimination provides for securing a host of
other rights. "People who suffer discrimination because of race, gender, religion,
or membership in any other social group," he explained, "typically face systematic
denials of numerous other internationally recognized human rights.").
137 For a recent book-length study assessing the UN system, see MINGST &
KARNS, supra note 49.
138 Under this policy, the minority regime instituted more than 100 laws de-
signed to keep blacks and whites separate. The most (in)famous of these was the
Population Registration Act designed to ensure the purity of the white race. A
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effects spread through all of southern Africa like bush fire because
of (1) the determination by whites, in the face of fierce resistance
by blacks, to maintain this policy; 139 and (2) its application on
Namibia (formerly Southwest Africa), a trustee territory, taken
from Germany, the League of Nations let South Africa manage. 140
Some of the darkest highlights in the history and evolution of
this policy include pass laws which severely restricted blacks' free-
dom of movement within their own country;141 expropriation of
black lands and settlement of blacks in so-called homelands; 142 the
treason trial of Mandela and other African National Congress
(ANC) leaders and Mandela's imprisonment for 10,000 days (or 27
years); 143 the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 in which more than 69
blacks died;144 the Soweto uprising in which 700-1000 blacks
died;1 45 the death of black consciousness leader, Steve Biko, in the
specie of bureaucrats called race inspectors enforced this law. These inspectors
inspected babies in hospitals and they come in to investigate any time someone's
race was in question. To help them determine a person's proper racial classifica-
tion, they examined skin, hair, and nails. A bad joke in South Africa relating to the
Population Registration Act went: "They put a pencil in your hair-if it falls out
you're white, if it stays in you're colored." BARRY DENENBERG, NELSON
MANDELA: "No EASY WALK To FREEDOM" 30-31 (1991).
139 See CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 473-77.
140 Namibia, in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA 155-57 (F. Jeffres Ramsay, ed., 8th
ed. 1999).
141 Among the most hated of apartheid laws, these pass laws require blacks to
carry passbooks designed to identify them at all times, anywhere they go. They
were a tool that the minority government used to control where blacks lived and
worked. Passbooks have to be produced on demand. They can be issued by any
white person, even children. The pass laws were vigorously enforced. On average,
200,000 thousand Africans a year were arrested for pass "offenses." Thousands
were convicted every year for violating these pass laws. DENENBERG, supra note
138, at 31-32.
142 The homelands were 8 rural reserves, taking up thirteen percent of South
Africa's worst lands (e.g., lands stricken by drought) where the minority white gov-
ernment forced half of the black population, amounting to a third of the total pop-
ulation, to live. DENENBERG, supra note 138, at 65, 92.
143 DENENBERG, supra note 138, at 49-57, 86-90, 135-144.
144 DENENBERO, supra note 138, at 65-73.
145 DENENBERG, supra note 139, at 99-106. (The Soweto uprising is reputed as
"the most serious confrontation" between blacks and the white minority regime.).
One writer has explained that part of the reasons blacks resorted to bloody defi-
ance of the kind Soweto symbolized was because they had nowhere to seek re-
dress. South Africa is signatory to the UN Charter, but the provisions of the
Charter were never promulgated as law in the country. Pretoria was not signatory
to any of the three instruments of the International Bill of Rights. As a result, the
courts could not protect citizens against human rights abuses. BRENDALYN P. AM-
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repressive hands of South African police; 46 and Pretoria's policy
designed to stabilize any and every neighboring country which
sought to assist the ANC and the South-West African People's Or-
ganization (SWAPO) in their struggle against the minority re-
gime.147 Briefly, like slavery and colonialism before it, there is no
known category of human rights-political-civil, socioeconomic, and
solidarity rights as well as individual and collective-that apartheid
did not violate. Apartheid made blacks third class citizens in parts
of their own continent 148 and formed a major reason why Professor
Ali A. Mazrui, in his political diagnosis of the African condition,
characterized Africans as the most humiliated people in the history
of humankind. 149
Authoritarianism is arbitrary and non-institutionalized rule
that is characterized by the absence of legal-constitutionalism and
normative rules, a feature which accordingly makes such rule "per-
sonal" politics or instrumental.' 50 In their impressive work on the
topic, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg identified four categories
of authoritarian rulers as princes,151 autocrats, 152 prophets, 153 and
tyrants.1 54 Most of these regimes were one-party systems which tol-
erated no political opposition and were noted for their lack of citi-
zen participation, among other human rights deprivations or vices.
BROSE, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AF-
RICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 9 (1995).
146 DENENBERG, supra note 138, at 91-98.
147 See CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 404. (SWAPO was among the guer-
rilla groups which fought for the independence of Namibia. The group's leader,
Sam Nujoma, became the first President of an independent Namibia.).
148 ALl A. MAZRUI, THE AFRICAN CONDITION: A POLITICAL DIAGNOSIS 23-
45 (1980).
149 Id. (discussing "the cross of humiliation" Africans bear).
150 See ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN
BLACK ARFICA at x, 1-82 (1982).
151 Leaders like L6opold Senghor of Senegal, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Wil-
liam Tubman and William Tolbert of Liberia, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and
Gaafar Numeiri of the Sudan, among others, typify this category.
152 This category subsumes leaders like Fdlix Houphouet-Boigny of C6te
d'Ivoire, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Omar Bongo of Gabon, H. Kamazou
Banda of Malawi, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now Congo Republic, among
others.
153 Leaders exemplifying this category include Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana,
Sdkou Tour6 of Guinea, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.
154 Exemplified by Jean-Bed6l Bokassa of Central African Republic (later
Empire and back again to Republic), Macfas Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, and
Idi Amin in Uganda.
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Among these authoritarian regimes, the most egregious, topping all
others in scale of abusiveness, were the tyrannical regimes of Gen-
eral Idi Amin in Uganda, 155 Jean-Bed6l Bokassa in the Central Af-
rican Republic, 156 and Francisco Macfas Nguema in Equatorial
Guinea. 57 During his reign of terror from 1971 to 1979, Amin ex-
pelled the community of Asians in Uganda, expropriated their
properties, and turned Uganda into a "slaughter-house" by killing
or causing the disappearance or exile of hundreds of thousands of
the citizenry, among other atrocities. 158 Bokassa brutally murdered
over 100 schoolchildren for the "political offenses" of defying his
orders and mouthing "Death to the Emperor!" 159 Following an un-
successful coup against his government, a thoroughly insecure Ma-
cfas Nguema perpetrated rounds of non-stop purges, carried out
political executions of persons he suspected opposed his regime,
and caused the exile of over 100,000 in a population of approxi-
mately 300,000 people.160 A common feature that characterized au-
thoritarianism in Africa was poor economic record. Unlike their
counterparts in Asia, dubbed developmental dictatorships for their
supposed ability to use authoritarianism to build the economy,16'
African authoritarian regimes produced slow or negative economic
progress. 162 African dictators canvassed the primacy of socioeco-
155 See JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 252-265; SAMUEL DECALO,
Coups AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 139-198
(2d ed. 1990) (portraying Uganda under Amin among "personal dictatorships.").
156 See JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 242-44.
157 See JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 245-51; also SAMUEL DE-
CALO, PSYCHOSES OF POWER: AFRICAN PERSONAL DICTATORSHIPS 31-76 (1989).
All of these three regimes were overthrown in 1979. CRAWFORD YOUNG, IDEOL-
OGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 313 (1982).
158 See JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 252-65; Uganda, in GLOBAL
STUDIES: AFRICA 133-35 (F. Jeffres Ramsay, 8th ed. 1999).
159 See JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 243.
160 See JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 245-51.
161 Developmental dictators believed that stability and economic develop-
ment were not possible within the context of a liberal democracy. Major features
of this dictatorship include labor regimentation and exploitation, mobilization of
the society behind market-based or state-based developmental strategy, restriction
of mass consumption, and suppression of liberties and human rights, among them
free movement. For more on this phenomenon, see Richard Sklar, Democracy in
Africa, 26 AFRICAN STUD. REV. 11-24 (1983).
162 See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 127-28
(1996) who, in all fairness, also questions the hypothesis of positive relationship
between authoritarianism and development. See id. at 127 ("A case for authorita-
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nomic over civil-political rights, 163 but achieved the dubious distinc-
tion of promoting neither category of rights.
Post-colonial Africa is a continent rife with political conflict.
Political cohesion is elusive in Africa.1 64 Ever since most of the re-
gion became independent in the 1960s there has been no point in
time that a major war is not going on somewhere in Africa. 165 No
single country in the continent has collapsed entirely from violence
(although Liberia and Somalia came closest to doing that), but then
not one country has also totally escaped periods of militant or sub-
versive strife.166 This "politics by the gun" in the continent 167 re-
flects "an absence of consensus on questions of policy,
participation, representation, equality, justice, and accountabil-
ity"; 68 and it challenges "either the decisions or composition of the
particular regimes or the integrity, validity, or viability of state au-
thority. ' 169 Professor Naomi Chazan and her colleagues identified
five main kinds of political conflicts in Africa, namely: elite, fac-
tional, communal (or ethnic), mass, and popular, conflicts.170 None
of these categories is mutually exclusive given that, as these schol-
ars explain, different forms of conflict appear in different combina-
tions in Africa, and each African country and each regime type has
invited its own structure of political conflict. 171
Wars pose serious negative consequences for human rights.
The Nigerian civil war (1967-70) led to the death of an estimated 3
million people, most of them Igbos.172 Ranked by one chronicler as
"the bloodiest civil war of the 2 0th century,' 73 the conflict, in eco-
rianism's being positively correlated to development does not really arise, because
democracy is part of the very meaning of political development.").
163 See Howard, supra note 62.
164 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 217.
165 Douglas Rimmer, The Effects of Conflict, 1k Economic Effects, in CON-
FLICT IN AFRICA 303 (Oliver Furley, ed., 1995).
166 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 217.
167 Rimmer, supra note 165, at 305.
168 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 216.
169 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 216.
170 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 198-216.
171 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 216.
172 EGHOSA E. OSAGHAE, CRIPPLED GIANT: NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
69 (1998).
173 A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A DOCUMEN-
TARY SOURCEBOOK 1966-1969 VOLUME I: JANUARY 1966-JULY 1967, at vii (1971).
Professor observed that this war to keep Nigeria one achieved by 1969 "the un-
wanted distinction of becoming the biggest, best-weaponed, and bloodiest war in
the whole history of Black Africa." See A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CON-
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nomic terms, cost the government a sum of money that in today's
rate would run into billions of U.S. dollars. 174 It left the eastern part
of the country, which attempted unsuccessfully to secede and form
itself into an independent Republic of Biafra, "in ruins, with infra-
structure and utilities destroyed and severe shortages of shelter,
food, clothing, and medicine." 175 The war is one of the major root
causes for the acts of generalized lawlessness and violence by
soldiers during military rule that Peter Agbese calls "privatized re-
pression." 176 More recent conflicts in Africa that approach the
genocidal proportions of the Biafra War include the 1994 Hutu-
Tutsi conflict in Rwanda which involved the massacre of more than
500,000 Tutsis.17 7 In addition to these deadly consequences, unend-
ing conflicts in Africa are also responsible for the serious problem
of refugees and internal displacement the continent faces. 178 Africa
has the largest share of the world's population of refugees and in-
ternally displaced people. About 3 million people became refugees
or displaced as a result of the Biafra war alone.' 7 9 About 10 out of
an estimated 20-25 million internally displaced persons, and about 6
out of an estimated 17 million refugees, in the world are
Africans. 80
FLICT IN NIGERIA: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK 1966-1969 VOLUME 11: JULY
1967-JANUARY 1970, at 462 (1971).
174 OSAGHAE, supra note 172, at 69 (based on the estimates by Chief
Obafemi Awolowo, then federal commissioner of finance and drop in oil
revenues).
175 OSAGHAE, supra note 172, at 69. Violations during the war which took
place during the Nigerian side included civil rights curtailment in the name of war,
seizure or commandeering of private property like automobiles for prosecuting the
war, unchecked powers given to military and police personnel to draft people for
war, and security officials using the threat of draft into the military as a mechanism
to extract bribes from people afraid of going to war. Pita Ogaba Agbese, The Mili-
tary and the Privatization of Repression in Nigeria, 10 CONFLICT 255 (1990).
176 Agbese, supra note 175, at 239-66.
177 Rwanda, in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA 11.9-121 (F. Jeffres Ramsay, ed.,
8th ed. 1999)
178 M. Louise Pirouet, The Effects of Conflict, I: Human Rights and Refugees,
in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 165, at 287-92. For more recent, though more
narrowly focused, studies, see Assefaw Bariagaber, The Refugee Experience: Un-
derstanding the Dynamics of Refugee Repatriation in Eritrea, 18 J. THIRD WORLD
STUD. 47-70 (2001); and Assefaw Bariagaber, States, International Organizations
and the Refugee: Reflections on the Complexity of Managing the Refugee Crisis in
the Horn of Africa, 37 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUD. 597-620 (1999).
179 OSAGHAE, supra note 172, at 69.
180 Deng, supra note 41, at 355.
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D. Stage IV: Movement toward Protection
This stage consists of three events from the Table that give
cause for cheers in the history and evolution of human rights in
Africa. These three events of good news for human rights are the
achievement of majority rule in South Africa, post-authoritarian-
ism, and the coming into effect of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights. Majority rule came to South Africa following
the drafting and adoption of a multiracial constitution;18' the hold-
ing of general elections in which blacks, for the first time, partici-
pated; victory of the ANC in those elections; and the formation of
an ANC-led government of national unity with Nelson Mandela as
president. 82 Advent of majority rule marked a final end to
apartheid and all the odious features of segregation identified ear-
lier that characterized that official policy. Yet, even with abolition
of apartheid and the advent of majority rule, Africa is still not out
of the human rights woods with respect to South Africa. White mi-
nority rule in the country left in its wake, a legacy of huge dispari-
ties between blacks and whites in all facets of life, with far-reaching
ramifications for human rights, that are bound to challenge future
governments for a long time to come. 183 Adding now to this plate
full of problems already is the scourge of HIV/AIDS which afflicts
South Africans, among Africans, in the largest numbers. 84
181 See, e.g., Fran Buntman, South Africa's First Democratic Elections and
their Political Context, in MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
CONSTRAINTS To DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 241-80 (John Mukum Mbaku &
Julius 0. Ihonvbere, eds., 1998); Tom Lodge, The South African General Election,
April 1994: Results, Analysis, and Implications, 94 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 471-500
(1995).
182 See, e.g., Buntman, supra note 181; Lodge, supra, note 181.
183 See, e.g., CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 95, at 484-88; Charles Simkins, The
New South Africa: Problems of Reconstruction, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA,
109-122 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner, eds., 1999); Antoinette Handley &
Jeffrey Herbst, South Africa: The Perils of Normalcy, 96 CURRENT HISTORY 222-26
(1997); Kanya Adam, The Politics of Redress: South African Style Affirmative Ac-
tion, 35 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUD. 231-50 (1997); Steven Friedman, South Africa:
Divided in a Special Way, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING
EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY 531-82 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
184 See, e.g., Karen Jochelson, Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Nineteenth-
and Twentieth-Century South Africa, in HISTORIES OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASES AND HIv/AIDs IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 232-36 (Philip W. Setel, et al.
eds., 1999) (citing to reports projecting that between 3.7 to 4.1 million people in
South Africa will be infected with HIV and that about 600,000 may die of AIDS).
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Post-authoritarianism is the flip side to authoritarianism, to-
gether with the reverses for human rights that moment represented.
This event, which is still evolving, is a diffuse and amorphous mo-
ment tied to the movement, beginning in 1989, toward democracy
and increased respect for human rights in Africa 185 that, in our as-
sessment, includes the independence of Namibia, the political
changes in South Africa, and even the evolution of a full system of
human rights for Africa that the ACHPR's adoption symbolizes. By
the end of 1994, 38 of 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had held
competitive multiparty elections, 18 6 and the number of democra-
cies in the continent increased to 18, up from just 3 in 1988.187 By
1995, over twenty African countries legalized political opposition
parties. 188 Depiction of this event as post-authoritarianism must not
be taken to imply that the process is irreversible, for it is not. De-
spite the wind of democratic change softly breezing through Africa,
authoritarianism is not completely a thing of the past. A number of
African countries continue to remain under military rule. In some
of the countries where competitive elections have taken place, the
democratic credentials of the governments installed are questiona-
ble.189 There is, in short, a well-grounded feeling in some quarters
now that the movement has stalled. 190 By 1997, the number of re-
185 A sampling of the growing scholarship heralding this historic moment in-
clude DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA, supra note 183; AFRICA: DILEMMAS OF
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, (Peter Lewis, ed., 1998) (especially the selection of
four articles in Part 4 of this book); MICHAEL BRATTON & NICHOLAS VAN DE
WALLE, DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN COM-
PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1997); JOHN A. WISEMAN, THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR DE-
MOCRACY IN AFRICA (1996); and AMBROSE, supra note 145. Some scholarships in
this literature, such as DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE HARD ROAD AHEAD, (Ma-
rina Ottaway, ed., 1997) (especially the introductory chapter in the book by Otta-
way herself), and MARINA OTTAWAY, AFRICA'S NEW LEADERS: DEMOCRACY OR
STATE RECONSTRUCTION? (1999), are un-optimistic concerning the prospects for
democratic consolidation in Africa. See also Christopher Clapham, Democratiza-
tion in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects, 14 THIRD WORLD Q. 423-38 (1993); and
Samuel Decalo, The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Af-
rica, 91 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 7-35 (1992).
186 BRAT-rON & VAN DE WALLE, supra note 185.
187 Larry Diamond, Introduction: In Search of Consolidation, in CONSOLIDAT-
ING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES, supra note 64, at xiv.
188 Ali A. Mazrui, Conflict as a Retreat from Modernity: A Comparative Over-
view, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 165, at 23.
189 See, e.g., OT-rAWAY, supra note 185.
190 See, e.g., WISEMAN, supra note 185, at 156-77 (talking about "the uncer-
tain future of democracy in Africa" and the grounds for cautious optimism regard-
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gimes denominated democracies in Africa decreased from the high
watermark of 18 in 1994 to only 13.191
The adoption in 1981 of the ACHPR, also known as the Banjul
Charter, 192 signified an epoch-making event for human rights in Af-
rica.193 The adoption and subsequent coming into effect of the doc-
ument marked the evolution/unveiling of (1) a complete human
rights system for Africa;194 and (2) a regional human rights system
for the continent that is inspired by and built on the key UN human
rights instruments, 195 yet separate and distinct from the UN human
rights system. The Banjul Charter met the expectations of African
scholars and politicians alike who, before the charter's adoption,
craved for an African convention on human rights based on African
ing progress toward democracy in the continent); DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA,
supra note 183 (particularly Part III highlighting the several "ambiguities" that still
characterize the movement toward democracy in Africa). See also DIAMOND,
supra note 39, at 55, 298 n.87 (citing "democratic retrogressions" ranging from
flawed elections to fraud and intimidation to electoral subversions designed "to
clothe army coup-makers in civilian legitimacy that places little restraint on repres-
sive rule."). But overall, unlike other writer, Diamond takes a positive view of
future prospects for democracy in Africa. See DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 269-70
and Larry Diamond, Introduction, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA, supra note
183, at ix-xxvii.
191 Number based on calculation made appendix in DIAMOND, supra note 38,
at 279-80. Following the classification system devised by Freedom House, democ-
racies as used here encompass only "liberal democracies" (ranked first-order), and
non-liberal, electoral democracies (second-order), and exclude what Diamond
called pseudo-democracies and (one-party or no-party) authoritarian regimes.
Qualifying African countries include Benin, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius,
Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, and South Africa (denominated liberal democra-
cies); and Central African Republic, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, and
Mozambique (classified as non-liberal electoral democracies). Supra.
192 Banjul (pop. 44,536) is the capital city of The Gambia where the drafting
of the document was finalized.
193 PETER, supra note 72, at 7.
194 The African human rights system includes treaties like the Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, text
in ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, CONVENTION GOVERNING SPECIFIC As-
PECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA (1969); and the African Char-
ter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Nov. 29, 1990.
195 See Robert C. Wigton, Concordance of Basic Human Rights Guaranteed in
the Bunjul Charter and Other Major Human Rights Treaties, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 79, at 317; Claude E. Welch Jr., The
Organization of African Unity and the Promotion of Human Rights, 29 J. MODERN
AFRICAN STUD. 538 ( 1991); UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 123-26.
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philosophy and responsive to African needs, 196 though, as is only to
be expected, the orientation also leaves people dissatisfied who do
not believe in an African concept of human rights. 197 The organiza-
tion vested with responsibility for ensuring compliance with the
Banjul Charter is the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights. The commission came into being on November 2, 1987. It
identifies and investigates human rights violations and may expand
areas of application of the ACHPR. One major weakness with the
commission, however, is that it has no enforcement powers and
must rely upon executive decisions regarding human rights viola-
tions presented at the OAU Heads of States Summits. 198
The ACHPR came into force after many long years in the mak-
ing1 99 within which interval many acts of individual and collective
violations across all dimensions of human rights (civil-political, so-
cioeconomic, and solidarity rights) occurred. Although, as we have
seen, the most blatant and egregious of human rights abuses and
deprivations occurred in the tyrant regimes, few African countries
196 See, e.g., Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights De-
bate: An African Perspective, 9 HuM. RTS 0. 309-331 (1987) (typifying the intellec-
tuals); OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/X at 6, cited in PETER, supra note 72, at 9
(recounting President L6opold Senghor's admonition in 1979 to experts working to
produce a draft of the ACHPR to "show imagination," seek "inspirations from our
beautiful and positive traditions," and "keep constantly in mind our values of civi-
lization and the real needs of Africa.") (typifying the politicians, although Senghor,
who possessed the French equivalent of the Ph.D. and achieved fame for his Negri-
tude poetry, was in his own right also something of an intellectual). The search for
a distinctly African human rights instrument goes back to 1973 when a seminar on
"New Ways and Means for Promoting Human Rights with Special Attention to the
Problems and Needs of Africa" was held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. See U.N.
Doc. ST/TAO/HR/48 (1973), quoted in Richard Gittleman, The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, n. 22 (1982).
197 See, e.g., Paul N. Ndue, Africa's Turn Toward Pluralism, in GLOBAL PER-
SPECTiVES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE VIEW
FROM ABROAD 293, 296 (David Lai ed., 1997) (dismisses as "foolish," the idea of
an African conception of human rights).
198 See Claude Welch, The African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS Q. 43-61 (1991).
199 Some writers trace the history of the ACHPR to the Dakar meeting in
1979 at which President Senghor addressed a committee of experts working to
prepare a draft of the document. Others portray a history that goes further back.
See UMOZURIKE, supra note 28, at 24 (pointing to 1961, date of the conference on
"The Law of Lagos" in Lagos which made suggestion for an African Human
Rights Charter with court, and even further back to 1943 with Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe's, The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa, based on the Atlantic
Charter by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt).
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were immune completely from violations. "[O]nly Senegal," of the
numerosity of African countries, before the coming into effect of
the ACHPR, "accorded a reasonable respect for human rights. '200
Rhoda Howard's book on human rights in Africa published in 1986
was essentially a scholarship denoting/bemoaning the dire absence
of these rights. 20' And ideological coloration had no impact as both
capitalist and socialist African countries failed to respect the rights
of their citizens.202
In the face of all this, African leaders engaged in a vicious "sol-
idarity of silence," 20 3 no finger of condemnation raised, and the
OAU remained indifferent. The few exceptions were the likes of
President Nyerere who condemned Amin's reign of terror in
Uganda, though not for any disinterested reasons. 20 4 Many African
governments abused the human rights of their own citizens, and
curtailed the political participation of their citizens, including intel-
lectuals who were viewed as "poor relatives of development. '20 5
This was obviously what UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was
alluding to when, in his quiz of African leaders at a recent OAU
summit, he indicated that all of Africa is impoverished when even
one of its brilliant voices is silent.206 Many more maintained silence
in the face of tyranny, did nothing about genocide, secession, wars
and numerous other human rights atrocities. Enough now for lead-
ers who anchored their opposition to colonial rule on the human
rights-based argument that foreign rule violated the basic rights of
200 Martin L. Kilson Jr., History as Guide: Thinking About Human Rights in
Africa in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA 192 (F. Jeffres Ramsay, ed., 8th ed. 1999).
201 HOWARD, supra note 78.
202 See YOUNG, supra note 157.
203 ISSA G. SHIvJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 106 (1989) (quoting
President Julius Nyerere).
204 Milton Obote, whom Amin replaced, was a personal friend of Nyerere;
the large community of Ugandan exiles in Tanzania, including Obote himself, was
beginning to put pressure on Tanzania's fragile economy; and Nyerere's condem-
nation laid the ground for his support to the army of exiles from Tanzania that
invaded Uganda and overthrew Amin. For more on this invasion which Amin
himself, amazingly self-destructively provoked, see DENNIS AUSTIN, POLITICS IN
AFRICA 62-3 (2d ed. 1984).
205 See Philip C. Aka, Leadership in African Development, 15 J. THIRD
WORLD STUD. 218 (1997) (recounting the impression of participants in a 1988 con-
ference in Nigeria that few African countries existed within this period that did not
experience, in the name of nation-building, "the internal equivalent of a brain
drain" arising from unwarranted imprisonment, murder, and persecution or re-
pression" of intellectuals).
206 See Gaer, supra note 34; Minter, supra note 35.
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colonized peoples, including their rights to self-determination; 20 7
leaders who, during the nationalist struggle, fought for indepen-
dence invoking the equality embedded in international human
rights;208 and leaders known to condemn minority-ruled South Af-
rica for its sin of apartheid.20 9 The OAU as an institution did no
better. The organization took no meaningful action on drought,
famine, starvation, refugees, or other burning issues confronting
Africa. For example, it failed to successfully mediate a conflict like
the Biafra War fought in one of the most densely populated parts of
the world in which a national government sought to use starvation
to bring a people seceding from the country, faced with genocide,
into submission. 210 Briefly, as Rhoda E. Howard noted, "[t]he
rights of black Africans inside the borders of independent African
states appear[ed] to be of little real concern to the OAU. ' '211 Both
the organization and African leaders hinged their (in)action on two
principles in the OAU Charter. 212 These two principles are the
ones forbidding interference into the affairs of member-coun-
tries;213 and requiring respect for the territorial integrity of mem-
ber-countries. 21 4
In the light of these dismal statistics, introduction of the Banjul
Charter marked a new era for human rights in Africa. The ACHPR
is criticized for its "clawback clauses"which confine protection of
207 PETER, supra note 72, at 7.
208 Ali A. Mazrui, Socialism as a Mode of International Protest: The Case of
Tanzania, in PROTEST AND POWER IN BLACK AFRICA 1139, 1140 (Robert I.
Rotberg & Ali A. Mazrui eds., 1970). The distinction between Americans and
African nationalist leaders, as Mazrui noted, is that Americans proclaimed equal-
ity in pursuit of independence whereas African nationalists sought independence
in the pursuit of equality. Id. at 1140-41.
209 Takyiwaa Manuh, Law and Society in Contemporary Africa, in AFRICA
339 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O'Meara eds., 3d ed. 1995).
210 For a full account of the OAU unsuccessful intervention in the Nigerian
civil war, see, e.g., C.O.C. AMANTE, INSIDE THE OAU: PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRAC-
TICE 440-45 (1986).
211 HOWARD, supra note 78, at 5.
212 For a text of the OAU Charter, see P. OLISANWUCHE ESEDEBE, PAN-
AFRICANISM: THE IDEA AND MOVEMENT 1776-1991, at 249-57 (2d ed. 1994).
213 OAU CHARTER art. III, para. 2. Professor Umozurike challenges the in-
terpretation of this principle as basis for OAU (in)action with respect to human
rights for two reasons: (1) domestic jurisdiction does not cover matters of treaty-
law or customary law; and (2) by the time under consideration, respect for human
rights had been firmly established in international law. UMOZURIKE, supra note 28,
at 24.
214 OAU CHARTER art. III, para. 3.
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rights to their definition in national legislation; for its failure to in-
corporate charter norms into domestic legislation; for its non-inclu-
sion of a court of human rights;215 among other flaws. But a journey
of one thousand miles begins with one step, and, as Professor
Umozurike, former Chairman of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights, said, the Banjul Charter represents an
important new beginning for human rights in Africa.216 The
ACHPR creates a distinctly African conception of human rights
which recognizes civil-political, and socioeconomic rights, alongside
with the collective rights and duties of peoples. 217 Its adoption sig-
nified the zeal for human rights in the continent referred to in Part I
of this Article. The coming into force of the Charter energized civil
society,218 and, together with events in the world outside Africa,
may have contributed to the wind of democratic change that seized
Africa beginning in the early 1990s.
IV. ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
Our focus in this Part is on the military-as-institution, not the
military-as-regime, which topic is left for treatment in Part VI. The
military is perceived as a negative influence on human rights in Af-
rica. There are some who even go further to see the armed forces
215 See, e.g., Welch, supra note 198, at 43-61; Gittleman, supra note 196, at
690-709 (analyzing the Charter's limitations of the rights that it granted).
216 See Welch, supra note 195, at 554 (conveying Professor Umozurike's be-
lief that whatever its weaknesses, the ACHPR represents "a Charter of struggle for
African peoples whose expectations are now strengthened and legitimated.") (em-
phasis added); see also Manuh, supra note 209, at 339.
217 Manuh, supra note 209, at 339. (As Takyiwaa Manuh points out, Art. 61 of
the charter also allows for African customs and practice considered binding legal
rules to be used in the determination of applicable legal principles.).
218 See, e.g., the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development
and Transformation adopted in Arusha, Tanzania, on Feb. 16, 1990, following a
meeting of more than 100 non-governmental organizations from all parts of Africa.
The document stressed that nation-building in the continent requires "the popular
support and full participation of the people" and it defined the goals of African
development to include "human-centered development that ensures the overall
well-being of the people through sustained improvement in their living standards,"
among other requirements. The Arusha Charter attempted to formalize a new re-
lationship between government in Africa and their long-suffering citizens. One of
the sins of authoritarianism in the continent consisted in the conversion of the anti-
colonial slogan of "one-man, one-vote" into "one-man, one-vote-once." The Char-
ter symbolized the first steps in the retrace back to popular participation or one-
man-one vote. Text of the document, referenced as U.N. Doc. E/ECA/CM.16/11, is
reproduced in AMBROSE, supra note 145, at 195-206.
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and human rights as an oxymoron or two things that do not go to-
gether.2 19 This perception is probably because military rule in the
continent was marred by human rights abuses.220 However, the
armed forces, as an institution, have a major role in the protection
and promotion of human rights.221 Although by its nature, military
work is associated with force and soldiers control the instrument of
violence and war, these attributes by themselves without more do
not automatically make soldiers enemies of human rights. Three
main factors which form the basis of our position here of a role for
the military-as-institution in human rights are: (1) the relationship
between liberty and security; (2) the military's place as an impor-
tant political actor in society; and (3) a reading of relevant global
human rights instruments which, in our interpretation, assign
soldiers a role in human rights.
A. Relationship between Liberty and Security
Soldiers keep the peace without which any enjoyment of
human rights is compromised or rendered impossible. They do this
when they defend the country against external aggression. Wars, as
indicated, are moments of massive violation of individual and col-
lective human rights, across all three categories of human rights
classification. 222 Soldiers equally render a service for human rights
219 See Philip C. Aka, The Military and Democratization in Africa, 16 J.
THIRD WORLD STUD. 72-74 (1999) (including the extensive literature relating to
the topic cited therein).
220 See infra Part VI.
221 Although, as in this article, protection and promotion are sometimes in-
terchanged in human rights discussions, the two terms are words of art that do not
have identical or even similar meaning but rather, at least under the ACHPR, in-
volve different tasks or activities. The first Chairman of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights, reading Art. 45 of the ACHPR (outlining the
Commission's mandate) explains the terms thus: promotion is pedagogical and
includes, among other things, "functions relating to studies, research, information,
sensitization, consciousness-raising education, dissemination, training and further
training and general guidance . . . " Protection, on the other hand, involves "ex-
amining complaints of human rights violations" by states or private individuals,
among other tasks. Isaac Nguema, Introduction, in CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
GENEVA, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 2 (1990).
Simply put, under the ACHPR, promotion "involves steps to bolster awareness of
human rights," while protection "means acting directly on behalf of individuals
whose rights have been abridged. Promotion affects rights, promotion effects
them." Welch, supra note 195, at 536 (emphasis in original).
222 See supra Part III.C.
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when they engage in international (or multinational) peacekeeping.
A resurgence of peacekeeping accompanied the end of the cold
war.223 Peacekeeping can occur under UN auspices or as part of a
regional integration scheme. For example, the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS) has a peacekeeping unit,
the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), led by Nigeria. ECOMOG consists of military troops
from seven West African countries which, besides Nigeria, include
Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Senegal. 224 Growing
focus on multinational peacekeeping is a feature that marks an im-
portant departure from the nature and character of African armies
at independence. 225
One of the dramatic illustrations ever of the connection be-
tween security and liberty was made by President Abraham Lincoln
who, in suspending civil liberties during the American civil war
(1861-65), stated that preserving the union is the basis for guarantee
of any constitutional rights.226 Human rights "are minimum free-
223 Paul Omach, The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and
Convergence of National Interests, 99 AFR. AFF. 73, 75-77 (2000).
224 Oliver Furley, Introduction: Africa: The Habit of Conflict, in CONFLICT IN
AFRICA, supra note 165, at 14.
225 See infra Part V.
226 President Lincoln argued that his oath as president to preserve the consti-
tution to the best of his ability '."imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every
indispensable means, that government-that nation-of which that constitution was
the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitu-
tion?" Abraham Lincoln, quoted in RALPH A. RossuM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOL. I, at 180 (5th ed. 1999). The connection President
Lincoln made between liberty and security is one that is today universally recog-
nized in the literature. See Aka, supra note 52, at 432. There is no suggestion here
that the military is free to violate human rights provided it guarantees the unity or
territorial integrity of a country. To the contrary, a victorious army's conduct of a
war can expose it to weighty accusation of human rights violation. In Nigeria, one
of the questions today debated over 30 years after the Biafra War (1967-1970) is
whether the military used too much force than it needed to in terminating the
secession of the former Eastern region. About three million Igbos lost their lives in
the conflict. Such was the perception of excessive force that General Gowon, for-
mer Head of State, who led the national campaign to keep Nigeria one, was com-
pelled in a speech at Ibadan recently to defend that " . . . the federal side
conducted itself with good military discipline." See story on his talk Reflections on
the Nigerian Civil War: Some Preliminary Critical Notes, in VANGUARD (Lagos),
Sept. 4, 2001. (For people unschooled in the intrigues, mysteries, and inanities of
Nigerian politics, a larger purpose of Gowon's address was to rationalize why he
reneged on his promise to return power to civilians in 1976. The breach was among
the reasons for his being forced out of power in a coup in July 1975. Gowon ex-
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
doms people need to self-actualize themselves and contribute use-
fully to societal development. '227 Enjoyment of these rights is
severely hampered where peace is lacking.2 28 James Q. Wilson, in a
recent essay tracing the history (and future) of democracy, fingers
protection from invasion as an important condition underlying the
emergence and survival of the world's oldest democracies. 229 He ar-
gues persuasively that in countries like France, Austria, Hungary,
and Prussia, without secure boundaries, "demands for popular rule
and for a weak central government had to be subordinated to the
need for a powerful army. 230
B. The Military is an Important Political Actor in Society
Reinforcing the connection between liberty and security is the
military's position as an important political actor in society. Power
is not something that lies "around on the floor of the capitol or the
presidential palace. '2 31 The army's control of the instruments of vi-
olence and its function relating to defense of the territorial integrity
of the country against external attacks garner it a pre-eminence in
society few, if any other, entities have. This is true of Africa where
until recently soldiers dominated politics through direct interven-
tion in government. For example, in Nigeria, the military "shape[d]
the political, economic[,] and social formations of the post-indepen-
dence period." 232 It is equally true of developed countries like the
plained, most unpersuasively for a leader who led Nigeria for nine whole years and
at a time oil prices were at their highest, that he felt he needed to grow the Niger-
ian economy to buoyancy before handing over power.).
227 Aka, supra note 52, at 447.
228 The function of providing the stability and security that makes the enjoy-
ment of human rights possible is sometimes depicted as an essential function of the
government as a whole, rather than a responsibility solely for the military. See
Aka, supra note 52, at 430-32.
229 James Q. Wilson, The History andFuture of Democracy 3 (1999)(address
to students and friends at the Reagan Presidential Library, Pepperdine University,
School of Public Policy, Malibu California, Nov. 15, 1999, copy on file with author).
230 Id.
231 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 144
(1968). Revealingly, Ruth First titled her work on coups and military rule in Af-
rica, Power in Africa. RUTH FIRST, POWER IN AFRICA (1970). The book opens
with an epigraph of an eye-opening remark by L6opold Senghor, former President
of Senegal, who, upon surviving an abortive coup, reportedly stated: "After God, it
is above all to our armed forces that I must express the gratitude of the nation."
FIRST, supra, at viii.
232 OSAGHAE, supra note 172, at 54.
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United States where the military eschews direct intervention in the
governmental system, yet is an organization whose views are al-
ways taken into account and its loyalty "bought through military
appropriations, perks[,] and patronage." 233 The military is one of
twelve national institutions the American political scientist Thomas
Dye found run America.234
Also in Africa, during the era of authoritarianism, soldiers
were an influential power behind the throne in those countries
where soldiers managed to refrain from displacing the civilian au-
thorities and keeping power for themselves. These included "garri-
son socialism" regimes like those that existed in Angola, Burkina
Faso, and Ethiopia. 235 But they also encompassed nominally civilian
governments like Tanzania and Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens.
In Tanzania, members of the armed forces, called the People's De-
fense Forces (TPDF), held parliamentary seats, occupied positions
in the ruling party, and sat on the boards of government corpora-
tions (parastatals), among other perquisites. 236 In Sierra Leone, se-
nior military officers served in parliament and the cabinet. To top it
all, in 1985 President Stevens appointed the force commander, Ma-
jor General Joseph S. Momoh, to succeed him as president. Under
Stevens, military co-option into politics reached such heights that,
as some observers saw it, the country became "an army having a
state," rather than "a state having an army. '237 Testimony to the
power the military continues to command even in the post-authori-
tarian era in Africa is the fact that some of today's supposedly new-
breed leaders-such as Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mathieu K6r-
dkou of Benin, and Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma of Togo-are all former
military generals.238
233 Luckham, supra note 1, at 45 (describing African armies).
234 See THOMAS DYE, WHO'S RUNNING AMERICA?: INSTITUTIONAL LEADER-
SHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (1996).
235 "Garrison socialism" is a term JOHN MARKAKIS, NATIONAL AND CLASS
CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (1987) coined for military regimes, aligned to
the Soviet Union, which espoused the ideology of Marxist-Leninism.
236 Luckham, supra note 1, at 45.
237 Quoted in Luckham, supra note 1, at 45.
238 For basic statistics on African countries and their leaders, see, e.g., PETER
J. SCHRAEDER, AFRICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 359-67 (2000); CHAZAN ET AL.,
supra note 95, at 505-25. In addition to illustrating the continuing influence of the
military in African politics, this dominance of former military generals also raises
serious questions about the depth of the political changes today taking place in
Africa.
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C. Global Human Rights Instruments Assign Soldiers a Role in
Human Rights
In addition to the positive connotation for human rights that
exists in the traditional defense functions of the army, some key
global human rights instruments stipulate a role in human rights for
the military. One such instrument is the UDHR, which enjoined
"every individual and every organ of society . . . to promote re-
spect" for human rights.239 Arguably, soldiers are an essential part
of the population of "every individual" to whom the UDHR mes-
sage of human rights promotion is addressed. Also, as an institu-
tion, the military is an organ of society. In line with the UDHR's
injunction, human rights are becoming integrated into military
peacekeeping functions as the concept or idea of these rights grows
and takes deep root in the world. For example, human rights con-
cerns were an important part in the mandate of UN missions in
countries like Angola, El Salvador, and Guatemala.2 40 As earlier
indicated, far from being a run-of-the-mill, the military is an impor-
tant political actor in society. The momentum for human rights that
has accompanied the end of the Cold War 24a will be strategically
compromised if, oblivious to the Declaration's injunction issued to
every individual and every societal organ, an important societal
group like the military, which until recently in Africa dominated
politics, is excused from engagement in the struggle for human
rights.
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN MILITARIES
Several distinguishing features or characteristics mark out Af-
rican militaries. The first of these features is their colonial origins.
African armies are creatures of European colonialism.2 42 The only
countries in Africa European colonialism did not touch and which
could therefore validly claim to possess a truly indigenous army are
Ethiopia and Liberia. Even so a country like Ethiopia from 1936 to
239 Preamble to the UDHR (emphasis added).
240 Donnelly, supra note 12, at 530.
241 See Aka, supra note 52, at 421-48 (outlining the dynamics that give the
global campaign for human rights its inexorable character and advocating in-
creased education as a tool for promoting these rights in the aftermath of the Cold
War).
242 CHRISTOPHER, supra note 109, at 39 (describing colonial regimes as "es-
sentially military in basis and often in character.").
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1941 briefly came under Italian occupation and for the duration of
that occupation lost its independence. As an institution, the military
was fully involved in all stages in the evolution and maintenance of
the entire colonial project in Africa.243 It is ironical that the army
each African country claimed as its own on independence day was
one that in the colonial period had a crucial role in the control and
subjugation of the citizenry. 244 Until their Africanization 245 follow-
ing independence, European officers dominated the officer cadre of
the army in each African country.
A second feature of African armies, related to the first, is their
non-progressive character. African armies played little part in the
nationalist movements. These armies aligned themselves with colo-
nial rulers rather than band together with progressive forces agitat-
ing for independence like guerrilla fighters, trade unionists, and
student strikers. 246 Given this non-progressive outlook, the military
was generally held in low esteem.247 The nationalist leaders viewed
it as an "alien" institution that will need to be effectively controlled
by the party leadership once independence was achieved. 248 This
did not come to pass; rather, in many countries, the military actually
came to displace these former nationalist leaders.
A third characteristic of African armies, like the second, tied to
their colonial origins, is their tendency to be small and ill-
243 See generally id. (listing soldiers, along with missionaries and administra-
tors, as indispensable operators of the colonial government).
244 Little wonder, as one European scholar points out, that the use of the
armed forces "in the state's attempt to control society"continued after indepen-
dence. See KLAAS VAN WALRAVEN, DREAMS OF POWER: THE ROLE OF THE OR-
GANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY IN THE POLITICS OF AFRICA 1963-1993 at 45
(1999).
245 Africanization means the replacement of European officers with Africans.
For more on the policy, see e.g., DONALD ROTHCHILD, RACIAL BARGAINING IN
INDEPENDENT KENYA: A STUDY OF MINORITIES AND DECOLONIZATION 207-39,
239-84, 340-70 (1973).
246 J. Gus Liebenow, The Military Factor in African Politics, in AFRICAN IN-
DEPENDENCE: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 136 (Gwendolen M. Carter & Pat-
rick O'Meara eds., 1985).
247 Id.
248 Id. at 135-36. An aspect of this unprogressive feature is the fact, as Klaas
van Walraven points out, that few coups in the continent have had a strong reform-
ist current. Rather, except for the rare exception of Ethiopia under Mengistu and
Burkina Faso under Sankara where some revitalization of society occurred, army
intervention in Africa "signifies the mere circulation of sections within the modern
elite." VAN WALRAVEN, supra note 244, at 46.
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equipped. 24 9 These armies "suffer considerable technical, organiza-
tional and logistical limitations," among other problems.2 50 The co-
lonial authorities needed a military force large enough to help them
maintain foreign rule.25 1 As a result, the armies African countries,
with few exceptions, inherited at independence were mainly infan-
try with underdeveloped air, naval, and other defense capabili-
ties.2 52 To use Nigeria as an example, the country had only an army
(established in 1863) and a navy (founded in 1956) at its indepen-
dence in 1960. The air force came into being only in 1964, four years
after independence. From this very modest beginning and a size of
just 10,000 men under arms in 1967, the military several years after
metamorphosed into a formidable fighting machine of 250,000
soldiers2 53 due to internal conflict generated by the Biafra War
(1967-1970).254 At least one other country where internal conflicts
served equally to swell the size of the army was Ethiopia under
Mengistu.2 55 The hope was that after independence, the African
military would evolve into solid instrument for national defense.
This hope never materialized. Rather, as one analyst points out, in
many African countries, the military became something of a con-
duit for patronage and a tool political leaders used to maintain
themselves in power.2 56
A fourth feature African armies share is their mainly domestic
orientation which limits them to guarantee of internal, as opposed
to external, security.2 57 This is a feature tied to their colonial origins
and limited defense capabilities. But again, as in everything else, it
is a feature undergoing change. As earlier indicated, peacekeeping,
whether under the auspices of the UN or of a regional integration
249 See id. at 45.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 OSAGHAE, supra note 172, at 70; OLADIMEJI ABORISADE & ROBERT J.
MUNDT 246 (1998); TOYIN FALOLA ET AL., THE MILITARY FACTOR IN NIGERIA,
1966-1985, at 31 (1990).
254 See FALOLA ET AL., supra note 253, at 31 (pointing out how a military
which before the war "was crude and quite ill-equipped to prosecute a war" by
1981 became "modernized and professionalized by Third World standards.").
255 For more on the conflict in Ethiopia in particular and the Horn of Africa
generally, see CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, The Horn of Africa: A Conflict Zone, in
CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra note 165, at 72-91.
256 See Cdlestin Monga, Eight Problems with African Politics, in DEMOCRATI-
ZATION IN AFRICA, supra note 183, at 58.
257 See VAN WALRAVEN, supra note 244, at 45.
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organization like ECOWAS, is now a component in the functions of
many an African army.258 A fifth feature is the perception of the
military as an organization where people with unimpressive educa-
tion unable to make a career elsewhere flock to. The English writer
Herbert G. Wells (1866-1946) once wrote: "The professional mili-
tary mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no
man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in
such a calling. ' 259 This is no less true of Africa. Brigadier David
Ejoor of the Nigerian army once likened the Nigerian army to an
institution for the conversion and discipline of educationally chal-
lenged "hooligans and thugs" who otherwise would be let loose on
society.260 A large proportion of the officer cadre in the Nigerian
army in the past were persons with little formal education who pol-
ished their training by attending short military courses abroad.261
But this one too, like the previous, is a feature that has undergone
considerable change. Today, many commissioned officers of the
Nigerian army are graduates of the Nigerian Defense Academy or
non-military tertiary institutions. Quite a number are also recipients
of advanced university degrees, continuing a trend started by the
likes of Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu who joined
the army in 1957 following completion of graduate education in his-
tory from Oxford University in England. 262
A last but not least feature shared by African armies is their
intervention into politics. As earlier indicated, the army played a
partnership role in the maintenance of colonial rule in Africa. How-
ever, the model in the colonies during the period leading to inde-
pendence and in military schools like Aldershot and Sandhurst in
the mother countries where a number of African soldiers received
their military training, was that of military nonintervention into
258 See supra Part IV.A.
259 Wells' novels include THE WAR OF THE WORLDS (1898).
260 Quoted in FIRST, supra note 231, at 352.
261 See WILLIAM D. GRAF, THE NIGERIAN STATE 41 (1988) (describing the
Nigerian army as "poorly educated" and disclosing that "66 percent of combat and
non-combat officers had no more than secondary education before being commis-
sioned."); see also ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 253, at 106, 108, 109 for the
educational profiles of Generals Babangida, Abacha, and Abubakar. None of
these career officers, each of whom rose through the ranks all the way to head of
state, had anything beyond high school preparation when they joined the army in
the early 1960s.
262 See FREDERICK FORSYTH, EMEKA 11-16, 25-31 (photo. reprint 1992)
(1982).
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politics and unfettered subordination to civilian supremacy.263 Afri-
can armies who intervened in politics, for whatever reason, unfortu-
nately failed to internalize this creed of political neutrality. 264
VI. THE MILITARY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
Military rule formed an intrinsic part of authoritarianism in Af-
rica.265 Four of the authoritarian rulers Robert Jackson and Carl
Rosberg studied in their important work on personal rule in Africa,
namely, Gaafar Numeiri of Sudan; Mobutu Sese Seko of former
Zaire, now Congo Republic; Jean-Bed6l Bokassa of Central Afri-
can Republic; and Idi Amin of Uganda, were military rulers or had
a military background. 266 Of the three authoritarian leaders with
the most egregious human rights records that Jackson and Rosberg
classified as tyrants, two, Amin and Bokassa, were products of the
military. Military rule shares with the other varieties of authoritari-
anism the common problem of poor economic performance or re-
cord.267 In Nigeria, one of the outcomes of military rule from 1983
to 1998 was a deterioration in the country's economy, necessitating
its reclassification by the World Bank from a middle-income econ-
omy to one of the poorest countries in the world.268 Agitation in the
country for democratic rule has something to do with the belief of
the generality of Nigerians that economic progress is possible only
under a non-military government. 269 Military rule, as experienced
263 DAVID THROUP, The Colonial Legacy, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA, supra
note 165, at 254.
264 Id.
265 See, e.g., JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 150, at 32-38.
266 Such was the case with Bokassa who was a soldier when he seized power
from his cousin, but thereafter crowned himself emperor and renamed his country
Central African Empire. Id. at 242.
267 For the veritable industry of scholarships that has evolved on the phenom-
enon of military rule in Africa, including the (mis)performance of military regimes
in office, see, in addition to works like FIRST, supra note 231, and THE MILITARY
IN AFRICAN POLITICS (John Harbeson ed., 1987), the numerosity of works cited in
JACKSON & ROSBERG, supra note 151, at 32 n. 17, 64 n. 78.
268 From 1980 to 1992, the Nigerian economy grew at minus 0.4 percent. The
country's per capita income dropped dramatically from about $1,000 in 1980 to
$345 in 1998. See Robert Guest, Survey Nigeria, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 5;
Rotimi Oyekanmi, Nigeria Slides on Human United Nations Growth Scale,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 1998; JOSEPH N. WEATHERBY ET AL., THE OTHER WORLD:
ISSUES AND POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 183 (3d ed. 1997).
269 Philip C. Aka, Education, Economic Development, and Return to Demo-
cratic Politics in Nigeria, 18 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 22 (Spring 2001).
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in Africa during the period of authoritarianism, embodies numer-
ous repressions with ramifications for human rights, that were then
magnified by the widespread nature of military regimes in the conti-
nent. We will first look at the magnitude of the problem after which
we next discuss the restrictions.
A. Widespreadness of Military Rule in Africa
Coup d'6tats and military rule became a feature of African
politics just about the moment African countries became indepen-
dent.270 The first military takeovers in the continent took place in
Egypt in 1952 and the Sudan in 1958. Military rule came to sub-
Saharan Africa in 1963. That was the year of the Togo coup which
overthrew the government of President Sylvanus Olympio, who was
assassinated in the takeover.27' By the late 1960s, about two-fifths
of African states had come under military rule and coups had effec-
tively replaced elections as a method for changing government in
the continent. States afflicted by this epidemic included Ghana,
where President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, and Ni-
geria which that self-same year experienced two violent changes of
government. 272 The 1960s have appropriately been called "the mili-
tary decade in Africa. '273 By the mid-1980s, few African countries
existed that had not been touched by the virus of military interven-
tion into politics. 274 These military takeovers do not include count-
less unsuccessful coup attempts. So widespread this phenomenon
became that some students of military politics in Africa suggested a
change in the approach to subject matter in the scholarship from
focus on the widespreadness of military intervention to explanation
270 The earlier literature on coups and military rule in Africa portrayed these
phenomena positively. For example, Ruth First, in her important work on the
topic, depicted military coups as a "silent clamor for change," FIRST, supra note
231, at 1-23.
271 DECALO, supra note 156, at 1-2.
272 Id. at 1-32. A complete scoreboard of these military takeovers, beginning
with Egypt in 1952 and ending with Somalia in October 1969, is contained in FIRST,
supra note 231, at 12-14.
273 Aristide Zolberg, The Military Decade in Africa, 25 WORLD POL. 309-31
(1973).
274 One of the factors of African politics highlighted in a survey of the first
twenty-five years of African independence, unsurprisingly, was "the military fac-
tor." See Liebenow, supra note 246, at 126-59.
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of military non-intervention!275 Military rulers come into office
pledging to return power once they have corrected whatever politi-
cal, economic, or social problems that made them seize power. This
promise was hardly kept since the ruling group sought to perpetu-
ate its stay in office, until driven away either through popular upris-
ing,276  foreign intervention,277  or a counter-coup. The few
exceptions were countries like Benin (1963 and 1965), Ghana (1969
and 1979), Nigeria (1979 and 1999) and the Sudan (1964 and 1985),
where, occasionally, sometimes tortured "managed transitions" oc-
curred. 278 Soldiers face a legitimacy problem upon taking office. To
be sure, this is not a problem unique to military regimes in Africa
since civilian governments also confront the same problem.279 Was
it not the civilian transformation of the anti-colonial slogan of "one
man-one vote" to "one man-one vote, once," 280 to begin with, that
brought about military intervention into politics in Africa?281 How-
275 Zolberg, supra note 273, at 309-31; Samuel Decalo, Modalities of Civil-
Military Stability in Africa, 27 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 550 (1989) ("On statistical
grounds alone the question of how the minority of 'deviant' states have managed
to avoid coups may by now be far more academically significant than why they
erupt.").
276 As in the Sudan in 1964, but otherwise usually rare.
277 As by France in Central African Republic in 1979, and by Tanzania in
Uganda same year. Like popular uprising, this is also rare.
278 The term "managed transition" was invented by Professors Michael Brat-
ton and Nicolas van de Walle; see BRATTON & VAN DE WALLE, supra note 185, at
170-72. The transition is at times tortured because, for example in a place like
Nigeria, such transition was preceded by breach of a promise to hand over power.
See TRANSITION WITHOUT END, supra note 124 (analyzing the spurious transition
program of General Babangida).
279 See ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, The Marginality of Afri-
can States, in AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE, supra note 246, at 52 (characterizing Af-
rica as a continent where constitutionalism has not shaped political behavior given
that both civilian and military rulers have seized or retained power through uncon-
stitutional means). See also Paul N. Ndue, Restoring Legitimacy to Public Author-
ity in Twentieth-Century Africa, 28 PERSP. ON POL. ScI. 75, 80 (Spring 1999)
(contending that the biggest challenge Africa faces at the turn of the 21st century is
how to restore legitimacy to public authority).
280 See KENNETH J. MENKHAUS, Political and Social Change, in HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TRENDS FROM THE
1960s TO THE 1990S (Mark W. DeLancey ed., 17th ed. 1992).
281 See FIRST, supra note 231, at 124-201 (analyzing "the failure of politics,"
focusing on the Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana); Larry Diamond et al., Introduction:
What Makes for Democracy?, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note
183, at 46 (stating that " ... military role expansion is induced by the corruption,
stagnation, and malfunctioning of democratic institutions" such that the military is
called to maintain order).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
ever, (il)legitimacy poses more problem for a military regime than a
civilian government. 282 As one top Nigerian military officer and for-
mer foreign minister, invoking Winston Churchill's famous epigram
comparing democracy with other forms of government, bluntly puts
it, " . . . [c]ertainly, there is no way military rule can be preferred
over democratic rule. '283
B. Repressions Characteristic of Military Rule in Africa
Army take-over poses problems for human rights because peo-
ple get killed when the military seizes power. Few military coups
are bloodless. The abuse of rights can be worse when a coup is un-
successful. Plotters of failed coups are more often than not exe-
cuted in Africa. The failure of a coup can also sometimes lead to a
war in which millions of people are killed. Some analysts attribute
the Nigerian civil war to the failure in the eastern region of the July
1967 coup. 28 4 If we accept this obviously plausible interpretation,
the July 1967 coup ended only following successful termination of
the Biafran secession on July 12, 1970, and only after millions of
Igbos attempting to secede from Nigeria had been killed or starved
to death. This interpretation would make the coup the longest ever
in Nigeria history.
Where a coup succeeds and the military takes over, the actual
period of military rule also can have serious ramifications for
human rights. We discuss three of those ramifications or restrictions
here. They are: (1) abrogation of civil rights; (2) abridgment of po-
litical rights; and (3) widespread acts of lawlessness and violence
(privatized repression) by soldiers targeted against civilian popula-
tions. Violations of civil rights occur when soldiers suspend all or
some of the provisions of the constitution and rule by military de-
crees and edicts upon seizing office.285 These suspensions often af-
282 See BRATrON & VAN DE WALLE, supra note 185 (pointing to the "crisis of
legitimacy" African military regimes faced by the late 1980s).
283 Major-General Joseph N. Garba, A Time for Hope, Resolve[,] and
Change, 15 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 463 (May 15, 1994). Churchill once
stated that "Democracy is the worst possible form of government, except for all
others."
284 See FALOLA ET AL., supra note 253, at 22 (stating, inter alia, that the "July
[1966] coup provided the occasion for the emergence of two principal actors of the
Nigerian civil war.").
285 As Nigeria exemplifies, under military rule, the Constitution becomes sim-
ply an ordinary law of the land. Charles Mwalimu, The Influence of Constitutions
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fect the bill of rights or fundamental guarantees of citizens in the
constitution. In Nigeria, the military suspended more than 131 pro-
visions of the 1979 constitution, including the writ of habeas corpus
and the supremacy clause purportedly outlawing military govern-
ments.286 Thousands of Nigerians were detained following the en-
actment in 1984 of Decree Number 2287 which allowed the
government to detain anybody without trial for up to six months
"for acts prejudicial to state security. ' 288 In his article on privatized
repression in Nigeria, Professor Pita Agbese argued that the wide
latitude of the decree, coupled with the strong climate of fear its
promulgation generated, allowed members of the security agencies
to invoke the threat of sanctions under the decree for their own
private ends.289
Another restriction on human rights associated with military
rule is abridgment of political rights. Soldiers have minimal toler-
ance for dissent and they can harbor intense aversion for politics
and politicians.290 This is why, upon taking office, they often dis-
band the legislature, abolish political parties, and outlaw many
forms of political activities.291 Political rights military rule affects
sometimes include the right of groups to self-determine themselves
or exercise control over their destiny. For example in Nigeria, Gen-
eral Babangida promulgated the Treason and Treasonable Offenses
Decree of May 1993, stipulating the death penalty for advocacy of
"ethnic autonomy. ' 292 The law was a response to increased activism
on the Development of a Nation's Law and Legal System: The Case of Zambia and
Nigeria, 8 ST. Louis UNIV. PUB. L. R. 178 (1989).
286 See id.
287 State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree, Federal Republic of Nige-
ria, Official Gazette, vol. 71, No. 8, of Feb. 13, 1984); cited in Agbese, supra note
175, at 254.
288 Id. The special power to detain to was initially granted only to the Chief of
Staff, Supreme Headquarters (the No 2 in the government), but was, in an amend-
ment to the law, extended to include the Inspector General of Police and the Min-
ister of Internal Affairs. Id. Broad as the powers of the government were already
under this law, the government expanded on those powers and garnered itself
wider latitude, to the detriment of human rights, by interpreting its authority under
the decree to mean that it is required to inform a detainee that he or she is being
held under the provisions of the decree but is not obligated to disclose to the de-
tainee the grounds on which he or she is being held. Id.
289 Id.
290 Aka, supra note 219, at 73.
291 Id.
292 See ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 253, at 238.
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by the Ogonis and other minority groups in the Niger Delta de-
manding increased share of oil revenue and some scholars perceive
the government action as understandable.2 93 However, the regime
was using its governmental authority to impose the death penalty
for the "crime" of mere advocacy of ethnic autonomy. Another as-
pect to the abridgment of political rights that occurs during military
rule is severe restriction of the press. In Nigeria, the military en-
acted repressive media laws, detained journalists under those laws,
and closed down media houses, among numerous other acts of me-
dia censorship.2 94 One single event which in recent times more than
any event symbolizes military repression of the media in the coun-
try, arguably, was the death during the Babangida years of the in-
vestigative journalist, Dele Giwa. Giwa, one of the founders of
Newswatch, an independent and fearless Nigerian weekly, was
blown into pieces as he unsuspectingly tried to open a parcel bomb
sent to him by individuals many in the country believe to be secret
security agents of the government.295
A third and final restriction on human rights that takes place
during military rule arises from "privatized repression. '296 These
are widespread acts of violence and lawlessness perpetrated by rank
and file soldiers against civilian populations. In Nigeria, these seem-
ingly isolated acts of lawlessness included soldiers:
* engaging in mob attacks on civilians, at the least
provocation and sometimes without any provocation
at all. These attacks encompassed beating civilians,
harassing them, unlawfully detaining them, and de-
stroying valuable properties;
" setting up illegal roadblocks in order to extort bribes
and collect private tolls from motorists;
" flogging motorists as a method of traffic control;
" seizing goods from traders in the market place;
293 Id. (conveying their belief that the government "had a vested interest in
chilling the protest climate" generated by Ogoni strident activism).
294 See, e.g., Ogbondah, supra note 67, at 21-26 (listing about 14 military army
decrees that constrain human rights in Nigeria).
295 See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent
into Praetorianism, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 183, at
450, 486 n.100 (providing evidence seeming to tie the Babangida government to
the murder).
296 Agbese, supra note 175, at 239-66.
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" forcing sellers to reduce the prices of goods and
services;
" refusing to pay for goods and services and beating or
threatening to beat up sellers of those goods and ser-
vices who dare to demand payment;
" abducting women from the parents' homes rather
than pay bride-price;
" breaking into stores and warehouses and seizing
hoarded goods which they then distribute at give-
away prices;
" attacking the home of the well-known Nigerian mu-
sician, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, setting the house
ablaze, throwing his mother out of the window, and
beating up Fela and any member of his household
they found in the home. 297
Still on Nigeria, one military governor, in 1984, ordered soldiers to
cane thirty-five employees of the state broadcasting corporation for
coming late to work.298 Although seemingly isolated, these acts led
to loss of lives and unnecessary destruction of valuable property
and their combined and widespread effect impacted human rights
negatively in the country. As Professor Agbese, who studied this
phenomenon explains, repression is privatized when rank and file
soldiers intentionally use their membership in the armed forces for
private gains.299 Privatized repression occurs during military
rules300 and produces huge economic payoff for both rank-and-file
soldiers and their top officers.301 One of the factors forming the
context for privatized repression is negation of the rule of law
which follows a successful military takeover. Such negation leaves
the impression that absolute power is personified in the body of
each and every member of the armed forces and allows soldiers to
molest civilians at will. 30 2
297 See id. at 239-40, 240-41, 243, 252, 255.
298 GRAF, supra note 261, at 150.
299 Agbese, supra note 175, at 240, 241, 245, 261, 262, 263.
300 Id. at 253 (arguing that "[m]ilitary rule provides the primary context
within which privatized repression takes place in Nigeria.") (emphasis added).
301 Id. at 243.
302 Id. at 253. A multiplicity of other contexts which Agbese argued provide
fertile grounds for privatized repression in Nigeria include a high rate of illiteracy;
the fact that civilians cheer when ordinary soldiers assault generally hated or ineffi-
cient institutions like the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), notorious for
20021 411
412 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
We will conclude this discussion on the impact of military rule
on human rights in Africa on a note of two observations. The first is
that there is no such thing as military rule benign to human rights.
Even military regimes whose rules were comparatively "benign"
abused human rights. One such "benign" regime was the Mathieu
Kr6kou government in Benin. However, as one analyst points out,
the K6rkou regime was "a military dictatorship that imprisoned
anyone deemed a threat to its security. '30 3 Another country often
pointed up in Africa as a human rights haven even when the mili-
tary is in office is Nigeria. For example, Professors Rolf Theen and
Frank Wilson, in their comparative politics text, state that Nigeria
has "one of the most positive records on human rights in all of Af-
rica," and that military rule in the country "has usually been an
authoritarian one but an enlightened one as far as respect for civil
liberties is concerned." They wrote that "[t]here have been some
restrictions on political activities but little political repression" in
the country.30 4 However, like in Benin, as we have seen, the country
was not free of human rights abuses. The attack in April 1977 which
razed down Afro-beat musician Fela's "Kalakuta Republic"
home 305 took place under the military regime of General Olusegun
Obasanjo, the first of only two military regimes in the entire history
of Nigeria known to have organized a successful power handover to
civilians. What little civil liberties could there still be in the country
after the numerous repressive military decrees we have referred to?
A factor which gives these decrees special potency is that they may
not be challenged in court. For example, Decree No. 1306 which sus-
its epileptic power supply; repressive written and oral decrees enacted by the mili-
tary plus the before mentioned contexts of military rule and the civil war. See id. at
253-57.
303 John R. Heilbrunn, The Flea on Nigeria's Back: The Foreign Policy of
Benin, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 63, at 50.
304 ROLF H.W. THEEN & FRANK L. WILSON, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES 544-45 (3d ed. 1986).
305 Agbese, supra note 175, at 252. A commission of inquiry set up by the
government to investigate the assault against Fela reported that the Nigerian musi-
cian was beaten and his house set on fire by "unknown soldiers." The verdict of the
commission led Fela, known already for his knack to produce music that ridicule
the military, to released a song he titled "Unknown Soldiers." Id. at 259.
306 NIG. CONST. (Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, 1984)
(1999). Section 3 of this military order stipulates that "the power of the Federal
Military Government to make laws shall be exercised by means of decrees signed
by the Head of the Federal Military Goverment." NiG. CONST. (Constitution (Sus-
pension and Modification) Decree, 1984) sec. 3 (1999).
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pended and modified portions of the 1979 Constitution provided
emphatically that "no question as to the validity of this or of any
Edict shall be entertained by any court of law in Nigeria." As one
writer points out concerning these decrees, "courts have no powers
to nullify edicts or decrees, no matter how much they violate funda-
mental human rights or interfere with the rights of citizens. '30 7 It,
therefore, makes sense to argue, as that same writer does, that these
military decrees "were used to cover up blatant abuse of human
rights. ' 30 8 How could Nigeria under military rule still be a human
rights haven when, as Professor Agbese points out, looking at
privatized repression, "numerous Nigerians are harassed and re-
pressed daily by members of the Nigerian armed forces"? 30 9 Notice
that Professors Theen and Wilson talked about authoritarianism
and enlightened respect for civil liberties; and of restrictions on po-
litical activities but little repression. However, as we have shown
already, these things do not go together. In Nigeria under military
rule, even a law supposedly designed to facilitate transfer of power
to civilians imposed penitentiary restrictions on the population.310
In the end, these repressive and wide-ranging laws cannot but "cre-
ate the impression that anything that any soldier does against civil-
ians is officially sanctioned by the state. '311 Although African army
leaders, such as those in Nigeria, pride themselves for standing for
law and order (and unity), the unvarnished fact is that a successful
military coup in and of itself negates the rule of law. The temptation
and risk of violation then grow when soldiers prolong their stay in
office. Legitimacy is always a problem for every military regime. As
the second generation of military rule in Nigeria shows, military
rule becomes more rapacious and progressively human rights-abu-
sive with prolonged military stay in office. Then, again as Nigeria
illustrates, societal opposition to military rule grows and there may
307 Dan Agbese, The Courts in the Dock, NEWSWATCH, May 26, 1986, at 21.
308 Id.
309 Agbese, supra note 175, at 243.
310 See id. at 254 (citing order No. 19 (Transition to Civil Rule) Decree of
1987 stipulating a term of imprisonment for up to 5 years without option of fine for
"[a]ny person who organizes, plans, encourages, aides, cooperates or conspires
with any other person to undermine, prevent or in any way do anything to forestall
or prejudice the realization of the political program" designed to return the coun-
try to civil rule).
311 Id.
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be the tendency, "naturally," for the military to react forcibly to the
increased pressure to return power, in the process, abusing rights.
The second and final observation made here is that civil-demo-
cratic rule is qualitatively different from military rule. Because the
legislature is disbanded and the judiciary is effectively integrated
into the executive branch, 312 there is a tendency, under army rule,
for the military"... to convert the executive branch of government
into a single unified branch of legislature, executive, and judici-
ary. ' 313 Put differently, under a military regime, "the only branch of
government under the doctrine of separation of powers ... is the
executive branch of government. '314 The legislature is proscribed
and the judicial branch is integrated into the executive branch. A
point which makes this consolidation of the governmental branches
detrimental for human rights is that under a military regime, the
judiciary is unable to either enforce fundamental freedoms for the
citizens or check governmental abuse of human rights. 31 5
Control of absolute power by the military that occurs during
military rule leaves much room for exercise of discretionary powers
which can easily result in authority being exercised arbitrarily based
on the whims and caprices of military officers. 316 This consolidation
of powers is the reason why in supposedly federal systems like Ni-
geria, the government operates in a unitary fashion during periods
of military rule.31 7 Briefly, as a Nigerian military leader once
stated, military rule is inferior and obviously less preferable to civil-
democratic government.318
312 Mwalimu, supra note 285, at 184.
313 Id. at 181.
314 Id. at 184.
315 See DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 75 ("If individual and group rights are to
be protected, and if abuses of power are to be constrained and punished, the judi-
cial system must have a high degree of institutional coherence, capacity, and
autonomy.").
316 Agbese, supra note 175, at 253.
317 See Mwalimi, supra note 285, at 179 (arguing, essentially, that section 1 of
the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree of 1984, no. 1, empower-
ing the Nigerian federal government "to make laws for the peace and good of
government or any part thereof in respect of any matter whatsoever" left sub-
national governments little powers.)
318 Garba, supra note 283, at 463.
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VII. AFRICA AND GLOBALIZATION
The farther and more deeply we penetrate into matter,
by means of increasingly powerful methods, the more
we are confounded by the interdependence of its parts.
... All around us, as far as the eye can see, the uni-
verse holds together, and only one way of considering
it is really possible, that is, to take it as a whole, in one
piece.319
A. Defining Globalization
Globalization is not easy to define, partly because, as Peter
Stalker points out, the term is used so loosely and applied to so
many different processes that its meaning is steadily becoming elu-
sive.320 Globalization may be defined as global restructuring.321
Specifically, it is an occurrence "characterized by widespread eco-
nomic liberalization and tremendous surges in international trade
and investment. ' 32 2 Within the past two decades, processes within
the international system "produced a qualitatively different world
economy. '323 These processes include the vastly increased integra-
tion of international markets through new patterns of trade, fi-
nance, production, and capital flows; and an increasingly dense web
of treaties and international institutions.32 4 This is an economic-
319 PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN 48 (1955).
320 PETER STALKER, WORKERS WITHOUT FRONTIERS: THE IMPACT OF
GLOBALIZATION ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 2 (2000).
321 James H. Mittelman, How Does Globalization Really Work?, in GLOBAL-
IZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 234, 235 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); see also
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 228-29
(3d ed. 2001) (globalization "expresses a... widespread feeling that the very na-
ture of world politics is changing.").
322 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human Rights?, 25
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 136 (1999). Globalization is a much discussed subject on which
an entire industry of works has appeared already. A sampling of this rich litera-
ture include the collection of essays in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF
A NEW CENTURY: A READER (Patrick O'Meara et al. eds., 2000); GLOBALIZA-
TION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 321; KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 321,
at ch. 10.
323 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 136.
324 Id. See also CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL 24 (1996) (embodying a more compre-
hensive list of changes that includes: a rapid increase in the mobility of capital; a
resulting increase in levels of structural differentiation and functional integration
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based definition of the concept. 325 But globalization is much more
than economic forces.326 As opposed to a mere economic event, it is
a process that integrates economics, politics, culture, and ideol-
ogy,327 specifically a "worldwide phenomenon" involving "a coales-
cence of varied transnational processes and domestic structures,
allowing the economy, politics, culture, and ideology of one country
to penetrate another. '328 In short, globalization refers "both to the
compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of
the world as a whole." 329
There are four discernible elements to the nature and/or defini-
tion of globalization. First, globalization is not a completely new or
recent phenomenon. Rather, it is the "intensification of economic,
political, social, and cultural relations across borders" 330 before now
already existent;331 something, like the movement of people across
in the global economy; a shift away from resources and toward human skills as the
critical element in wealth creation; a startling growth in information flows and the
capacity to process information; the emergence of a global culture; and pressures
on the governments of states, who are compelled to manage their economies in
accordance with a global search for comparative advantage, and by the impact of
values derived from the global culture by way of demands both from external ac-
tors and their own people).
325 See also Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sorenson, Introduction: What Has
Changed?, in WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END
OF THE COLD WAR 7 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sorenson eds., 1995) (stating
that globalization "entail[s] a movement toward a single, unified global economy
326 KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 321, at 230-33 (outlining multiple dimen-
sions of globalization, along with the economic).
327 James H. Mittelman, The Dynamics of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION:
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 321, at 2.
328 Id. at 3. See also KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 321, at 230-33; RONALD W.
Cox & DANIEL SKIDMORE-HESS, U.S. POLITICS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
CORPORATE POWER, CONSERVATIVE SHIFT 2 (1999) (defining globalization as "a
historical process led by constellations of political actors, many of which originated
in the overlapping worlds of business and politics in the United States.").
329 ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL
CULTURE 8 (1992). See also Ali A. Mazrui, Address to the 19th Annual Meeting
of the Association of Third World Studies, Inc. (Oct. 13, 2001) (draft available at
http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcs-site/dirton7.html) (denominating globalization
"gradual villagization of the world.").
330 Holm & Sorensen, supra note 325, at 4 (emphasis added).
331 As far back as 1957, Karl Polanyi, talked about a "double movement," an
expansion of market forces and a reaction to those forces in the form of demands
for self-protection against capital's socially disruptive and polarizing effects, pro-
pelling modern society. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE PO-
LITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 219 (1957).
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borders, that goes back to the very beginning of time.332 Building
on this notion of ancient processes in a new world, writers like Pe-
ter Stalker have argued that we "more realistically" view globaliza-
tion "as the latest phase in a long historical process ... -333 What is
truly new about the phenomenon and therefore forms its essence,
he maintains, is that barriers between relatively independent enti-
ties like states, economies, and cultures are dissolving, in the pro-
cess opening up the possibility of some kind of global
consciousness.334 But, although, as we have argued, it is not really
new, globalization embodies changes that have accompanied the
end of the Cold War and are therefore associable only with the
post-Cold War era.335 Globalization "directs attention to funda-
mental changes under way in the post-Cold War era. ' 336 "The phe-
nomenon of [hu]man" in our time, as the opening epigram
announces prophetically, is one of increased confoundment regard-
ing interdependence of parts, specifically the realization that the
more the universe holds together, "only one way of considering it is
really possible, that is, to take it as a whole, in one piece. '337
Second, globalization does not encompass processes that are
essentially national. 338 Nor is the phenomenon "development" or
modernization. 339 Third, although globalization involves processes
that may be denominated inter-national, it is not internationaliza-
tion,340 defined as an increasing number of events taking place si-
332 See the specific examples Peter Stalker cites, some of them going back to
the period of the Middle Ages in Europe. STALKER, supra note 320, at 3. Address
by Professor Mazrui, supra note 329, where Mazrui most appropriately calls
globalization "ancient processes in a new world."
333 STALKER, supra note 320, at 10.
334 Id. at 8.
335 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24. But note that there is no agreement yet
as to whether globalization is a new international system that replaced the Cold
War. See the debate between Thomas L. Friedman (contending that it is) and
Ignacio Ramonet (maintaining contra), in Thomas L. Friedman & Ignacio
Ramonet, Dueling Globalization: A Debate Between Thomas L. Friedman and
Ignacio Ramonet, in WORLD POLITICS 10-20 (Helen Purkitt ed., 21st ed. 2000-01).
One point, though, on which agreement exists is that globalization today, in our
time, dominates international relations.
336 Mittelman, supra note 327, at 2; see also KEOHANE & NYE, supra note
321, at 228-29.
337 DE CHARDIN, supra note 319, at 48.
338 STALKER, supra note 320, at 8.
339 STALKER, supra note 320, at 8.
340 STALKER, supra note 320, at 2.
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multaneously in more than one country.341 Rather, globalization, in
its strongest sense, goes beyond internationalization and implies a
higher plane of organization, one at which discrete national entities
are themselves dissolving so that all major political and economic
decisions will ultimately be transmitted globally. This new world
perceives the "death of geography" 342 and, for example, the demise
of the nation-state. 343 Simply put, globalization signifies the evolu-
tion of new webs of interdependence that are, for the first time,
creating a truly global system.344 The fourth and final element is
that globalization constrains national options and erodes the integ-
rity of national boundaries. 345 For countries and national govern-
ments, globalization, as Professor Mittelman points out, means that
"[s]tatecraft, tested as it is by non-state actors, is reduced in efficacy
relative to transnational forces. '346
B. Two Views on the Effects of Globalization on Africa
Two views exist on the effects of globalization on Africa. The
first paints a roundly negative picture of those effects. The Third
World is viewed as "the battleground of globalization, '347 and Af-
rica is characterized, for example, as "the third world's third
341 STALKER, supra note 320, at 2.
342 RICHARD O' BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GE-
OGRAPHY (1992).
343 STALKER, supra note 320, at 8.
344 RUSSETr ET AL., supra note 29, at 397.
345 Mittleman, supra note 327, at 18; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New
World Order, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY: A
READER, supra note 322, at 118. See also James N. Rosenau, Preface to LONGMAN
ATLAS OF WAR AND PEACE 1 (Joshua S. Goldstein ed. 1999) (characterizing
globalization as the unfolding of the "processes of de-territorialization and techno-
logical diffusion that are altering our notions of space and time."); ARJUN AP-
PADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION
33 (1996) (stating that globalization makes landscapes give way to ideoscapes,
ethnoscapes, mediascapes, financescapes, and technoscapes).
346 Mittelman, supra note 327, at 7. Mittelman argues that "[t]he drive to
bring the state back to the forefront of social theory requires fresh analysis in light
of globalization." Id. For some scholars, this vitiation of statecraft by transnational
forces is the critical element that marks globalization. See RUSSETr ET AL., supra
note 29, at 397 (defining globalization to "mean a process whereby economic, po-
litical, and socio-cultural transactions are less and less constrained by national
boundaries and the sovereign authority of national governments.").
347 Mazuri, supra note 329, at http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcssite/dirton7.
html.
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world. '348 One African scholar, Fantu Cheru, identified five major
trends of globalization in the world economy, 349 four of which, ad-
vancement in biotechnology and micro-technology, decreased diffu-
sion of investment, structural adjustment as an ideology of
development, 350 and low regional cooperation, work against Africa.
Other negative effects globalization is said to portend for the conti-
nent include that it is debarred "from gaining access to world soci-
ety's productive processes," 351 that it has become "the locus of
world poverty, ' 352 that it has experienced a shift from reliance on
bilateral assistance to multilateral concessionary loan,3 53 and that it
has lost $148 billion in capital flight.354 Globalization is said to spell
the absence of agreement on a vision of common agenda for Africa
in the post-Cold War era.355 "The greatest challenge" for Africa, as
Mittelman says, "is to demarginalize when national options are se-
verely constrained by the forces of globalization. '356 Paul Ken-
nedy's analysis forecasting which states, developed and developing,
stand the best chance of making it materially in the 21st century is
348 David E. Duncan, Africa: The Long Good-Bye, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 20
(July 1990).
349 Fantu Cheru, New Social Moverhents: Democratic Struggles and Human
Rights in Africa, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 321, at 146, The only one of the
five factors not a problem in that it could favor some African countries is increas-
ing differentiation among developing countries. Id.
350 See Mittelman, supra note 321, at 241 (conveying that the loss of control
from structural adjustment "is most pronounced in parts of Africa.").
351 Mittelman, supra note 327, at 18.
352 Diamond, supra note 63, at 255. The continents share of the world's poor
grew from 16 percent in 1985 to 30 percent by the turn of the new century. Id.
Also, as another scholar points out, half of the countries in the continent are under
World Bank and International Money Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams. Wright, supra note 63, at 17.
353 Mittleman, supra note 321, at 241. An important distinction exists be-
tween default on bilateral and multilateral loans. A country may default on bilat-
eral loans with manageable disruptions to the national economy. Most such
defaults precipitate negotiations to reschedule payments. But unlike bilateral
loans, multilateral debts must be dutifully repaid according to a prearranged
schedule. In the event of a default on these loans, the country will lose all access to
international credit. Few governments can endure such sanction, a reason why few
have ever gone into arrears on multilateral debt. Heilbrunn, supra 303, at 64, n.
47.
354 Wright, supra note 63, at 11 (quoting the Economic Commission for Af-
rica (UNECA)).
355 Id. at 9.
356 Mittelman, supra note 327, at 18.
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one which portrays Africans as losers.357 The point is not whether
these statistics are accurate, for they are. It is that the view on the
effects of globalization on Africa is one-sided and static.
The second view on the effects of globalization paints a more
complex picture of those effects. A recent work illustrative of this
alternative view is by Christopher Clapham who wrote that for Af-
rica impact of changes introduced by globalization is "in many ways
peculiar. ' 358 First, the continent was globalized in the late 1 9th cen-
tury by European colonialism, which had imposed structures of eco-
nomic production, systems of government, and cultural changes in
language and education. 359 European colonialism linked the conti-
nent to the processes of global capitalist development. 360 In this
sense, he said, the increased economic and political external control
beginning in the 1980's represented "a return to familiar conditions
of subordination, . ".. 361 Yet, interestingly, Africa was less affected
by most of the changes than any other world region.362 For exam-
ple, he explained, the spread of global capital scarcely affected the
continent given the existence there of so few places where transna-
tional corporations could find safe and potentially profitable invest-
ment opportunities. 363 Additionally, the increase in information
flows, compared to the rest of the world, was likewise negligible. 364
Clapham's depiction agrees with our caution elsewhere against
wholesale and undifferentiated application of the notion of
globalization. 365
Unlike the first, this second view is dynamic. Professor James
H. Mittelman depicts globalization as "changing structured hierar-
chies" 366 and conceptualizes the implications of the divisions of la-
357 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21' Century, in GLOBALIZATION AND
THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY: A READER, supra note 322, at 323-354.
Professor Kennedy predicated his forecast on global trends in economics, the envi-
ronment, politics, demographics, and technological innovations.
358 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24.
359 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24.
360 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24.
361 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24.
362 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 25.
363 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 25.
364 CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24.
365 See Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the
Notion of African Marginalization, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 187-221 (Spring
2001).
366 James H. Mittleman, Preface to GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLEC-
TIONS, supra note 321, at xi (emphasis added).
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bor associated with global restructuring in terms of a series of
interacting relationships.367 This second view reflects that portrayal.
It is also more balanced and realistic. States are not "merely passive
objects exposed to the swell of globalization[J" rather, they "may
push, resist, attempt to circumscribe or twist" the forces of global-
ization "to their own advantage. ' 368 Karl Polanyi, in 1957, wrote
about a "double movement". "an expansion of market forces and a
reaction to it in the form of demands for self-protection against cap-
ital's socially disruptive and polarizing effects" that propels modern
society.369 James H. Mittelman and his colleagues have updated this
double movement by reinterpreting it as "opportunities and con-
straints presented by changing structured hierarchies" in a new mil-
lennium.370 Globalization involves a multiplicity of authors trying
to write their own histories.371 These include, in addition to govern-
ment entities, non-state actors or forces like multinational corpora-
tions, labor unions, religious movements, and the poor.3 72 These
disparate tendencies engendered in diverse contexts severely ques-
tion the notion of globalization as a unified force bulldozing the
world around it.373 In short, as Stalker said, "[g]lobalization is not a
monolithic, unstoppable juggernaut, but rather a complex web of
interrelated processes, some of which are subject to greater control
than others. '374 In addition to drawing attention to the changes tak-
ing place in the world at the turn of the millennium, globalization
also demonstrates the need for all countries, developed and devel-
oping, to respond creatively to those changes. 375 "A global era," as
367 Mittleman, supra note 327, at 7-8.
368 Holm & Sorensen, supra note 325, at 7; see also POLANYI, supra note 331,
at 219; RUSSETr ET AL., supra note 29, at 398 ("Globalization and national sover-
eignty are not mutually exclusive; states have some degree of choice about how to
distribute the costs and benefits of the market."). As James Mittleman points out,
even the UN system, together with the doctrine of sovereignty that system en-
shrines, is a defense, albeit today a weak and ineffectual response, by developing
countries against the forces of globalization. Mittleman, supra note 321, at 239.
369 POLANYI, supra note 331, at 219.
370 Mittelman, supra note 366, at xi.
371 Mittelman, supra note 321, at 232.
372 See id.
373 Id.
374 STALKER, supra note 320, at 10. See also CLAPHAM, supra note 324, at 24
(stating that the emergence of a global culture is being challenged by a reaction
toward particularist ideas and that everywhere the impact of the changes coming
from globalization is complex and often contradictory).
375 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 63, at 1-22; Timothy M. Shaw & Julius E.
Nyang'oro, Conclusion: African Foreign Policies and the Next Millennium: Alterna-
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UN Secretary General Kofi Annan told the UN General Assembly,
"requires global engagement. ' 376 More than the first, this second
view does not paint a picture of states reduced to utter and pathetic
helplessness by the forces of globalization and is therefore more
realistic.
VIII. GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
A. Three Views of the Relationship between Globalization and
Human Rights
The relationship between globalization and human rights forms
for us here an object of analysis because ours is an Age of Rights as
well as an Age of Globalization.377 Three competing approaches or
theories have evolved for looking at this relationship. These three
approaches, christened based on their characterization of the na-
ture of the relationship between the two phenomena, are: (1) syn-
ergy, (2) globalization-as-exploitation, and (3) double-helix. 378 The
first two of the theories are dominant approaches, while the thirdis
an alternative account that has evolved in response to the explana-
tory inadequacies of the two dominant theories. 37 9
Synergy takes a positive view of the relationship between
globalization and human rights. Under this approach, globalization
and human rights take the appearance of parallel (or mutually sup-
portive) lines in that progress on one front is supposed to produce
progress on the other.380 The second theory, globalization-as-ex-
ploitation, paints a negative view of the relationship between
globalization and human rights. Under this theory, an inverse rela-
tive Perspectives, Practices, and Possibilities, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra
note 63, at 237-248.
376 Cited in KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 321, at 228.
377 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 125. This is a Rights-Globalization relationship
where, as Professor Jeffrey L. Dunoff correctly observes, one side in the equation,
Rights, gets more attention while the other, Globalization, receives little, if any
attention at all, effectively rendering the relationship nonexistent. Happily, the sit-
uation appears to be changing for the better. In November 1998, the Brooklyn Law
School held a symposium on the topic titled "The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets." One of the outcomes of the
meeting was this article by Professor Dunoff.
378 The names given to these approaches draw on Dunoff, supra note 324, at
125-139.
379 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 125-139
380 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 132.
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tionship exists between the two phenomena, 381 or regimes,382 as
Professor Dunoff denominates them. More graphically, the portrait
is one in which lines move in opposite directions in the sense that
increased globalization means increased exploitation and instabil-
ity, and decreased satisfaction of human rights.383 The dominant
theories are criticized as "two linear tales" 384 that are historically
inaccurate and misleading.38 5 As a result, a third theory, double-
helix, has evolved designed to present a truer or more realistic pic-
ture of the relationship between globalization and human rights. 386
A helix is not uni-linear but rather moves by a series of twists and
turns.387 The helix is double to reflect the two regimes-globalization
and human rights-in interaction. Under this more complex (and ho-
listic) model, globalization and human rights are depicted as two
regimes with lines which sometimes run parallel to each other and
at other times move in opposite direction or intersect at cross pur-
poses.388 Double-helix is, unlike the two dominant views or ap-
proaches, "a story of historical and political contingency, of
important but tentative gains and missed opportunities. ' 389 Table 2
embodies the statements of the relationship between globalization
and human rights under the various approaches.
B. The Three Views and Africa
Synergy portrays globalization as a non-zero-sum (or "win-
win") event that benefits developed countries as well as developing
ones.390 The theory teaches that economic liberalization and ex-
panded international markets are a vehicle for increasing economic
wealth and, indirectly, human rights. 391 More concretely, it per-
ceives globalization as a process that produces both wealth and
381 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 132.
382 For more on the concept of regimes in international relations, see for ex-
ample, GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 107-11; and RUSSETT ET AL., supra note 30,
at 358-75.
383 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 132.
384 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 132.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 125, 132-39.
387 See id. at 132-37 (illustrating with the history of U.S. promotion of socio-
economic rights).
388 Id. at 132.
389 Id.
390 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 126.
391 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 126.
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TABLE 2: CAPSULE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
THREE APPROACHES
Theory Characterization
synergy globalization is good or positive for
every country
globalization-as-exploitation: globalization is negative or bad for
every country
double-helix depending on the particular
circumstances, globalization can be
good or positive for a country
sometimes and bad or negative for
the same country at some other
times.
human rights maximization. 392 An empirical claim supporting syn-
ergy is that countries with open economies typically enjoy greater
rates of growth than those with closed economies. 393 A number of
hypotheses are then adduced to test this claim. One is that the
wealth that increased trade and investment make possible will per-
mit the funding of social and economic welfare programs, and the
satisfaction of economic and social rights.394 A second is that for
many nations, economic openness (along with the trade in ideas
that results) will create pressure for political openness and the satis-
faction of civil-political rights. 395 In addition to being descriptive,
synergy is also a normative theory396 in that, as Professor Dunoff
points out, international institutions, such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization
(WTO), and those dealing with human rights rest on similar con-
ceptions of human freedom and autonomy. 397
The theorization of synergy to the effect that the interaction
between globalization and human rights produces only benefits for
all countries is one-sided and incomplete. It also has no basis in
reality with respect to the African experience. The interaction be-
392 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 127.
393 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 126.
394 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 126.
395 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 126.
396 See Dunoff, supra note 322 at 126-7.
397 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 126.
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tween globalization and human rights has had beneficial effect on
human rights in the continent. One such effect beneficial to politi-
cal-civil rights is what Robin Luckham calls the shift in paradigm
from authoritarianism to democracy in Africa and the rest of the
developing world.398 However, not every outcome emanating from
the relationship is positive, as some have been negative. One such
outcome with negative consequences for human rights, particularly
socioeconomic rights, has been the ceding of economy autonomy to
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the
name of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). 399
Given that it takes a negative view of the relationship between
globalization and human rights, globalization-as-exploitation is the
opposite of synergy. The primary focus of the theory is on social
and economic rights, as well as on the distributional effects of
globalization. 400 It teaches that, while economic freedom may pro-
duce greater growth, this growth is highly uneven and is purchased
at the price of higher levels of income disparities and rates of pov-
erty.40 1 Under this theory, a primary effect of globalization is said to
be the widening of the gaps between rich and poor.402 Empirical
claims used to support this theory include that globalization has
been marked by an increasing divergence between the per capita
incomes of the richer and poor nations; and that the increasing di-
vergence between rich and poor occurs not only among nations, but
also within nations. 403 Variations of this theory, all of which are
connected by a common thread having something to do with the
negative symptoms of globalization, exist for developed as well as
398 Robin Luckham, Faustian Bargains: Democratic Control Over Military and
Security Establishments, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE SOUTH: THE JAGGED
WAVE, 121 (Robin Luckham & Gordon White eds., 1996). For identity of the fac-
tors connected with this shift, see Diamond et al., supra note 281, at 49-50 (predict-
ing the decreased support for authoritarian regimes by the industrialized
democracies this present era symbolizes); and DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 62 (list-
ing several factors that at the present time have prevented a new wave of demo-
cratic breakdown, among them: the total discredit of many military regimes for
their ineptitude; increased international support for democracy; growing embrace
of democracy culturally as a valued goal; and the non-emergence of an anti-demo-
cratic ideology with global appeal to challenge the global ideological hegemony of
democracy as a principle and as a formal structure of government).
399 See, e.g., Cheru, supra note 349, at 148-49.
400 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 127.
401 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 127.
402 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 127.
403 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 127-128.
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developing countries. One variation of this theory, relating to Af-
rica and other developing regions is the notion of globalization as
marginalization,40 4 specifically, the contention that so-called sound
economic policies imposed by international financial institutions
(IFI) cause or contribute to the widening gaps between rich and
poor in these countries.405
Globalization-as-exploitation portrays the interaction of
globalization and human rights as something always negative for
countries. But, like synergy, this portraiture is one-sided and incom-
plete. Not all outcomes flowing from the interaction between
globalization and human rights are negative. Rather, as already in-
dicated, some of those interactions are negative while others are
positive.
Double-helix is designed as a more textured, nuanced, and am-
biguous alternative to the two dominant theories.40 6 Unlike the sim-
ple linear relationship portrayed by the dominant theories, this
approach is marked by a series of shifting commitments within and
among nations that ebb and flow over time.407 The theory eschews
the logic of inevitability present in the other approaches, 408 repre-
sents a historically sensitive account of the unfolding relationship
between globalization and human rights,40 9 and suggests a contin-
gency to the effects of globalization that is missing from the other
theories.410 Unlike the two dominant theories, double-helix is, as
we have said before, quoting Professor Dunoff, "a story of histori-
cal and political contingency, of important but tentative gains and
missed opportunities. '' 411 Put differently, the theory signifies that
globalization is "neither inherently a friend nor a foe of human
rights. ' 412 This conclusion points to strategy as the viable way for-
ward: as Professor Dunoff aptly puts it, "whether there is anything
we can do to try to ensure that globalization is more friend than foe
404 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 128.
405 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 128.
406 See Dunoff, supra note 322, at 125, 132.
407 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 137.
408 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 138.
409 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 137.
410 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 138.
411 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 132.
412 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 138. As Professor Dunoff says, it is hard to
"answer in the abstract the ultimate effects of markets and globalization on human
rights and social justice for any particular society." Id.
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of human rights. ' 413 In short, "[t]hrough the policies they enact,
the practices they adopt and the safety nets they provide, states,
joined by non-state actors, still have a major role in determining
whether globalization will, in the end, turn out to be more friend
than foe of human rights. '414 We will return to this issue of strategy
later in the next Part of this article.
In sum, globalization complicates the dilemma of human rights
in Africa. The phenomenon is credited with "an emerging world-
wide preference for democracy" 415 and an "assertiveness of the
human rights movement" 416 that promotes civil-political rights.
However, it does not seem to help socioeconomic rights. A UN
study of African economies conducted several years ago revealed
that Africa is enduring an "economic catastrophe"of a magnitude
that "dwarfs the Great Depression. ' 41 7 Whether or not this result
was "caused" by globalization is immaterial, since this is an out-
come that occurred during globalization. This is a worrisome occur-
rence that is taking place against the backdrop of vitiation of
statecraft by transnational forces 418 and at a time when, as we have
indicated in Part II.B., "development" now includes attention to all
categories of individual and collective human rights.
IX. THE MILITARY, GLOBALIZATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS -IN
AFRICA: THREE STRATEGIES FOR MAKING GLOBALIZATION
MORE FRIEND THAN FOE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
Forgive past sins, or at least do not seek to punish
them.
Be strong and tactful too
Treat them generously
Keep them busy
413 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 138. (emphasis added). First principles we must
keep in mind in our attempt to make globalization to advance human rights (or
make globalized markets friends of human rights), as Professor Dunoff enumer-
ates them, include that: (1) liberalized global markets are simply means to an end
rather than "natural" or ends in themselves; and (2) achieving human rights and
social justice is a higher value than protecting free markets. Dunoff, supra note
322, at 139.
414 Dunoff, supra note 322, at 137.
415 Mittleman, supra 327, at 2.
416 Mittleman, supra 327, at 8.
417 Aka, supra note 205, at 224.
418 Mittleman, supra note 327, at 7.
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Teach them respect for democracy
Get the people on your side, but beware of promising
more than you can deliver.
If all else fails, abolish the army.419
As we concluded in Part VIII, whether globalization becomes a
friend rather than enemy of human rights is a function of what we
do or strategy. This is because there is nothing in the nature of the
relationship between globalization and human rights that inherently
and automatically makes globalization friend or foe of human
rights. During the era of authoritarianism, the London Economist
issued a piece of advice to leaders of new democracies, embodied in
the opening epigram, on how to deal with the military. From those
recommendations we distill three strategies that could be used to
give soldiers role and ownership of human rights in Africa. .Those
three strategies, which are closely interconnected, are (1) democ-
racy, (2) democratic control over the military, and (3) human rights
education. Table 3 contains a summary of the nature of the effects
of the three strategies on human rights. Of the three, only human
rights education has a direct connection or "impact" on human
rights. The nature of the effect of the other two strategies is more
"indirect" than direct. But we must keep in mind that "indirect"
does not mean insignificant since all the strategies are important
and none is inferior to the other.
Before getting to the strategies, a brief overview of the recom-
mendations by the Economist. The past sins the weekly talks about
are the sins of past human rights abuses by the armed forces. This
can be a sticking point because, as Larry Diamond points out, in
some places governments sometimes come "under considerable
popular pressure to rewrite the amnesty agreements that served as
the foundation for the military's withdrawal from politics. '420 His
position is that where, as in Brazil and Chile and other Latin Amer-
ican countries, it becomes necessary to offer amnesty for human
rights violations, this should not deter society from conducting a
419 ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1987, at 36, cited in SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 251-52
(1991).
420 Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner, Introduction to CIVIL-MILITARY RE-
LATIONS AND DEMOCRACY, at xii (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1996).
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thorough inquiry, through, for example, a truth and reconciliation
commission, designed "to exorcise the ghosts of a dark past."'42 ,
TABLE 3: NATURE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE STRATEGIES ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
Strategy Nature of "Impact" on Human
Rights
Democracy Indirect
Democratic Control over the Indirect
Military
Education on Human Rights Direct
The recommendation to remain strong and tactful is self-explana-
tory and requires no additional comment. But not so the injunction
to treat the army generously; the word "generously" can have more
than one meaning. Generosity could mean good conditions of ser-
vice.42 2 It could also mean something akin to bribery.423 Keeping
the military busy can mean engaging them in strictly military mis-
sions,424 including international peacekeeping. 425 It could also
mean, as Professor Samuel P. Huntington elaborates, providing
soldiers "with new and fancy tanks, planes, armored cars, artillery,
and sophisticated electronic equipment . . . New equipment will
make them happy and keep them busy trying to learn how to oper-
ate it."426 Teaching soldiers respect for democracy is self-explana-
tory and an issue tied to the three strategies we have elicited. So too
is getting the people on the side of democrats which we interpret to
mean maintaining popular support and legitimacy. Charges like
421 Diamond et al., supra note 281, at 48. Samuel P. Huntington counseled
that when in doubt: "do not prosecute, do not punish, do not forgive, and above
all, do not forget." HUNTINGTON, supra note 419, at 231.
422 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxxii ("Soldiers should be paid
decently, and they should never have to worry about whether they will be paid...
Officers' incomes and pensions should be competitive with private-sector manage-
ment positions, not only to induce loyalty to the reform process, but to deter cor-
ruption."). (emphasis in original).
423 See Luckham, supra note 398, at 124.
424 HUNTINGTON, supra note 419, at 252; DIAMOND, supra note 39, at 113-14.
425 Larry Diamond, Introduction: In Search of Consolidation, in CONSOLIDAT-
ING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 64,
at xxx; DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 113-14.
426 HUNTINGTON, supra note 419, at 252 (emphasis added).
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abolishing the army do not sound plausible or realistic. Effective
democracies need strong militaries,427 though not ones too power-
ful such that they endanger the stability and security of unconsoli-
dated democracies. 42 8 The military can play an important and even
crucial role in underpinning democracy if it remains professional,
apolitical, and subordinates itself to democratic control. 429 Some of
the techniques that amount to bribery, such as extending soldiers
with "generous" salaries or providing them with sophisticated
weapons beyond what they need are, as Robin Luckham points out,
non-conducive to democracy.430
A. Democracy
The first strategy that could be used to give soldiers a role and
ownership in human rights in Africa is democracy. Democracy, or
what Robert A. Dahl calls polyarchy,431 is a system of government
"in which the coercive powers of the state are effectively con-
strained by the constitution. '432 A set of pluralistic conditions any
democracy worth its name must meet include: meaningful and ex-
tensive competition among individuals and organized groups (e.g.,
political parties) for governmental offices through regular, free and
fair elections; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the
selection of leaders and policies; entrenchment of basic fundamen-
tal guarantees like free speech and free press; leader accountability
to the electorate; and existence of multiple channels beyond parties,
legislatures, and elections, for the representation of citizen inter-
ests. 433 In 'addition to these pluralistic features, quality is a key in-
gredient in the definition of any democracy. Democracy is a
427 Eboe Hutchful, Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition, in DE-
MOCRACY IN AFRICA, supra note 185, at 53-57.
428 See Luckham, supra note 398, at 125; see also Diamond & Plattner, supra
note 420, at xxxiv (pointing out that the autonomous power of a powerful military
may act as a factor diminishing the quality and stability of democracy even where,
as in Chile, a democracy is performing well).
429 See Sir Graham Burton, Nigeria: Making Democracy Work, GUARDIAN
ONLINE (Nov. 29, 1999), available at http://ngrguardiannews.com/editorial/
en768706.htm.
430 Luckham, supra note 398, at 124.
431 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8
(1971).
432 JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUB-
LIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 189 (1997).
433 See Diamond et al., supra note 281, at 6-7, See also DIAMOND, supra note
38, at 7-17.
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dynamic notion that entails progressive and widespread application
of democratic principles that proceed apace until "democracy be-
comes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and
even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achiev-
ing success. ' 434 The standard includes democratic institutions that
function effectively and remain legitimate, an active civil society,
and an economy that grows and redistributes resources so as to
minimize discontent and conflict.435 Otherwise, the political system
will be unable to preempt the violent conflicts that displace civilian
governments in Africa and other developing regions.436 Although
prone to instability, democracy is as yet the best political system or
government devised by humans.437 Democratic governments "offer
the best prospect for accountable, responsive, peaceful, predictable,
good government," 438 they promote "freedom as no feasible alter-
native can" 439 and democratic procedures and institutions afford
"the most appropriate way to govern collective life. '440 Democracy
maximizes the opportunities for self-determination in that it lets
persons "live under laws of their own choosing" and facilitates the
moral authority that allows citizens to make normative choices that
promote self-governance and autonomy. 441
Applied to human rights, where it is done well, democracy is
everything that authoritarian military rule is not. It stands for the
absence of the pressures of illegitimacy and unaccountable rule that
sets the ground for the use of force and repression of the kind that
434 Diamond, supra note 425, at xvii. All democracies are works in progress
rather than final destinations. Vaclev Hayel, former Czechoslovakia president,
once argued that even democratic veterans like the U.S. do nothing but merely
approach democracy:
As long as people are people, democracy in the full sense of the
word, will always be no more than an idea. In this sense, you too
are merely approaching democracy. But you have one great advan-
tage: you have been approaching democracy uninterruptedly for
more than 200 years and your journey toward the horizon has
never been disrupted by a totalitarian system.
Quoted in LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE A. MURPHY, APPROACHING DEMOC-
RACY 3 ( 2 ,d ed., 1999).
435 Luckham, supra note 398, at 124
436 See DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 116.
437 See supra note 283.
438 See DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 116.
439 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 88-89 (Yale Univ. Press
1989).
440 Diamond, supra note 425, at xvii.,
441 DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 3.
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leads soldiers to abuse human rights. From a practical standpoint,
democracy is the basis or context for the other two strategies ana-
lyzed in this Part. Little "democratic" control of the military and
security establishment exists without democracy, just as any talk of
education on human rights is meaningless without it. "There is no
better way of developing the values, skills, and commitments of
democratic citizenship," including respect for human rights, "than
through direct experience with democracy, no matter how imper-
fect it may be."'442 Conceptually, democracy also has value for
human rights given that these rights, particularly those relating to
political-civil rights, are viewed as intrinsic to the definition of de-
mocracy. 443 Africans will therefore do great service to the growth
of human rights in their continent just by letting democracy take
root there.
B. Democratic Control over the Military
Another strategy, additional to democracy, that, in the age of
globalization, could be used to give the military a role and owner-
ship in human rights in Africa, is democratic control over the mili-
tary. This strategy is an extension of the democracy strategy we
discussed before. This is because "[b]y definition, democracy cannot
be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to
civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitu-
tional order. '444
Two closely related but un-identical concepts connected with
the topic of democratic control over the army are "civilian
supremacy" and "objective civilian control." "Civilian supremacy"
occurs when firm subordination of soldiers to democratic control
exists. Features of this supremacy include the assignment of unques-
tioned authority to democratically elected government over all pol-
icy arenas, among those design and implementation of national
defense; constriction of the military role to matters of national de-
fense and international security; removal of the military from all
responsibility for internal security; and creation and proper func-
tioning of governmental structures designed to enable civilians to
442 DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 3.
"3 See Diamond et al., supra note 281, at 6-7; See also DIAMOND, supra note
38, at 7-17.
4" Diamond, supra note 425, at xxviii; see also Luckham, supra note 398, at
432
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exercise effective oversight and control of the army and security
agencies.445 "Objective civilian control '446 may be viewed as a con-
dition of equilibrium marked by "the minimization of military inter-
vention in politics and of political intervention in the military. '447
Something usually found in the industrialized democracies, 448 and,
to some extent, the new democracies of East Central Europe, 44 9
objective civilian control is characterized by features such as high
levels of military professionalism, constrained military role concep-
tions, subordination of the military to civilian decision, and auton-
omy for the military in its limited area of professional
competence.4 50 Democratic control over the army does not mean
civilian intervention into professional affairs of the military; it
means that the military is granted significant scope "to exercise its
professional judgment and competence within the broad policy pa-
rameters that civilians set. '451
Subjecting the military under civilian control can pose major
dilemmas for new democracies 452 and it is something that will take
a lot of patience, especially in a region like Africa with a past legacy
of extensive military intervention into politics. 453 But there are fac-
tors which, should they exist, could contribute to improved civil-
military relations. The first is effective governance. If democracy
works well, it will positively impact civil-military relations.454 Mili-
tary establishments do not seize power from successful and legiti-
mate civilian regimes. 455 But countries need not wait for military
influence in politics to ebb by some "natural" historical process.456
445 DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 113.
446 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE:
THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957) (exhaustively
analyzing this topic).
447 Samuel P. Huntington, Armed Forces and Democracy: Reforming Civil-
Military Relations, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 9-12 (1995); for the equilibrium analogy, see
HUNTINGTON, supra note 446, at viii.
448 DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 62.
449 Diamond, supra note 425, at xxviii.
450 DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 62.
451 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxvii.
452 HUNTINGTON, supra note 419, at 211-53 (extensively discussing these
problems as well as strategies for democratization of civil-military relations).
453 See Hutchful, supra note 427, at 43-64 (embodying a negative view of the
prospects of the evolution of such control in Africa).
454 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxxiii; DIAMOND, supra note 38,
at 115-16.
455 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxix.
456 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxxiv.
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This is because the whole essence of democratic control of the mili-
tary is well-thought-out strategic action. New democrats act danger-
ously when the take the military for granted.457 By acting
affirmatively, through a coherent incremental strategy, to reform
civil-military relations, new and unconsolidated democracies may
improve their political institutions and promote legitimacy.458 A
second factor that may contribute to improved civil-military rela-
tions and democratic control over the military relates to the disas-
trousness of authoritarianism on military institution and
professionalism. 459 Precisely, soldiers could be made to see that de-
mocracy is the best foundation for military professionalism; that not
only do they help democracy when they remain professional, apolit-
ical, and subject themselves to civilian supremacy,4 60 but that they
could resist democratic control only at their professional peril.461
This will, in the final analysis, amount to an important issue of trust
since democrats will have to convince military officers that ex-
panding civilian control will not compromise national security or
the institutional prestige and integrity of the military.462 Finally, re-
gional integration of military forces like ECOMOG in West Africa
could provide opportunity for participation in democratic collective
security that could make it difficult to execute a successful coup
against a national government. 463
C. Human Rights Education
The third and final technique or strategy that could be used to
give soldiers a role and ownership of human rights in Africa is edu-
cation on human rights. Human rights education embodies the
"dual perspective" of education as a human right (or the right to
education), and education about human rights.464 It is, in the word
of the UDHR, education "directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human
457 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxxiv.
458 Diamond & Plattner, supra note 420, at xxxiv.
459 Hutchful, supra note 427, at 54-55; DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 62.
460 Burton, supra note 429.
461 Hutchful, supra note 427, at 55.
462 DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 115.
463 See DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 116 (but focusing on the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)).
464 Douglas Ray & Norma Bernstein Tarrow, Overview to HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EDUCATION 3 (Norma Bernstein Tarrow ed., 1987).
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rights and fundamental freedoms. ' 465 Education in human rights
should inform soldiers and other citizens of their rights;466 lead to
an understanding of, and sympathy for, the concepts of democracy,
justice, equality, freedom, solidarity, peace, dignity, and rights and
responsibilities;467 and build their "awareness that oppressive laws
and inappropriate traditions may be reformed. ' 468 Indeed, as a UN
resolution marking the UN Decade for Human Rights Education
(January 1995 to January 2005) puts it, "human rights education
should involve more than the provision of information and should
constitute a comprehensive life-long process by which people ...
learn respect for the dignity of others and the means and methods
of ensuring that respect in all societies. '469
The content of this education varies from country to country
and sometimes, within the same country, from school to school, but
there is a common core to that content. That common core includes
familiarity with the main international documents on human rights;
people, movements, and key events in the historical struggle for
human rights; the main categories of human rights, along with du-
ties or obligations; and attention to various forms of injustice, ine-
quality, and incidents of discrimination like racism and sexism.470
The key, as the Commission on Human Rights puts it, is that
"knowledge of human rights, both in its theoretical dimension and
in its practical application ... be established as a priority in educa-
tional policies. ' '471
In accordance with these features and injunctions, the curricu-
lum in military schools or defense academies should include respect
of human rights and fundamental guarantees and help grow or in-
culcate in soldiers the tradition of non-intervention into the politi-
465 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 24, at art. 26; The same language
also appears in Art. 13 of the ICESCR and Art. 28 of the Convention of the Right
of the Child.
466 Ray & Tarrow, supra note 464, at 3.
467 Maitland Stobart, Prologue to HUMAN RIGHTS AND EDUCATION, supra
note 464, at x.
468 Ray & Tarrow, supra note 464, at 3.
469 UN Decade for Human Rights Education, U.N. GAOR, 4 9 h Sess., Agenda
Item 100(b), at 2, U.N.'Doc. A/RES/49/184 (1995); U.N. ESCOR, E/1994/24, 50th
Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 156, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132 (1994).
470 Stobart, supra note 467, at xi.
471 UN Decade for Human Rights Education, supra note 469 (citing Com.
Hum. Rights Res. 1993/56, U.N. ESCOR, 47h Sess., Supp. No. 3, at chap. II,
Sect.A, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23 (1993)).
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cal system. During the era of authoritarianism, training in foreign
military academies like Aldershot and Sanhurst did not help much
in internalizing the norm of non-intervention since soldiers still
seized power for themselves, but, as we see, part of the changes
associated with globalization is reduced attractiveness for authorita-
rianism and a growing option for democracy. 472 African soldiers
must learn, through human rights education, that good soldiers
don't take advantage of their monopoly over the instruments of co-
ercion to seize governmental control and/or abuse the rights of their
people; they subject themselves to civilian control and use what co-
ercive powers they have to protect their people. Another aspect of
human rights education for soldiers is that they themselves, like an-
yone else in society, have a responsibility for spreading the message
of human rights observance. As we indicated when discussing the
role the military as an institution plays in human rights, the General
Assembly statement proclaiming the UDHR which indicates that
"every individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect" 473 for human rights ob-
viously includes soldiers. Hopefully, through these educational
means, soldiers build on their awareness, as Douglas Ray and
Norma Tarrow said, that inappropriate traditions may be re-
formed. 474 Our position here on education on human rights as a
tool for making globalization more friend of human rights in Africa
tallies with our analysis elsewhere on the role of education in pro-
moting human rights in the post-Cold War era.475 There we argued
for the maintenance of a "skeptical frame of mind" regarding the
prospects of the new era for human rights, 476 counseling that "[t]he
benignity or auspiciousness of a new age, standing alone, should
never be a substitute for the global struggle or campaign, through
enhanced education, for human rights. ' 477
X. CONCLUSION
One of the difficult challenges of our time is what to do to
make the military a protector and promoter rather than violator of
rights in Africa. One way of grappling with this challenge is to give
472 See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 38, at 62.
473 See text of the UDHR in DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 165.
474 Ray & Tarrow, supra note 464, at 3.
475 Aka, supra note 52, at 421-48.
476 Aka, supra note 52, at 442-43.
477 Aka, supra note 52, at 422, 442, 447.
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soldiers a role and ownership in human rights. This Article explored
means for accomplishing that ownership. We argued that there is
nothing in the traditional role of the military that makes it a rights
abuser, but that military rule in Africa marked a period of wide-
spread human rights violation in the continent. In short, we made a
distinction between the military as an institution and the military as
a regime. Consistent with these positions, we proposed strategies
for giving soldiers a role and ownership in human rights in Africa:
democracy in place of military rule, consolidation of democratic
rule through means that include achievement of civilian supremacy
via democratic control of the military, and education on human
rights to the armed forces as well as to all other organs of African
societies.
An external global influence on human rights in the continent
this Article analyzed extensively was globalization. We painted a
complicated picture of the effect of the interaction between global-
ization and human rights in the continent by replacing uni-linear
depictions of those relationship with one more ambiguous and
nuanced; and we, of necessity, tied the three strategies we propose
for giving soldiers a role and ownership in human rights in Africa to
the phenomenon. One goal we sought to accomplish in integrating
this gargantuan and difficult-to-ignore phenomenon into our analy-
sis was to disabuse simplistic notions in the literature not just con-
cerning the nature of the effects of the relationship between
globalization and human rights but also on the impacts of the phe-
nomenon in Africa.
A zeal for constitutionalism and human rights marks the post-
Cold War in Africa that the African people and the international
community need to nurture and mold. No organ of society needs to
be a part of this new impetus for rights more than the military.
Soldiers were a major abuser of human rights during the era of au-
thoritarianism in the continent. They are also one group in society
with the potential to make or mar the movement toward democracy
in Africa. 478 There are two important points or messages embedded
in the strategies we propose in this Article. First is the strong associ-
478 Monga, supra note 257, at 57-58 ("Nearly everywhere in sub-Saharan Af-
rica, the armed forces remain a threat to hijack or halt democratization.");
MAHMOOD MONSHIPOURI, DEMOCRATIZATION, LIBERALIZATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE THIRD WORLD 2, 158 (1995) (focusing on the Third World as a
whole).
20021 437
438 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
ation between democracy and human rights in the continent. Two
of the strategies have something to do with democracy. The third,
human rights education, also is indirectly connected to democracy
in that, in contradistinction to authoritarianism, a democratic gov-
ernment affords the proper context for such education. A second
message is the ordinary or non-revolutionary nature of the strate-
gies. There is no magic wand for growing human rights in Africa
and for giving soldiers ownership of such rights. This is an area, as
in development generally, progress will be slow and not without
much pains. The battle for human rights in the continent is some-
thing that will have to be waged the old fashioned way and won
incrementally, no big waves.
